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"Just as the entire mode of existence of human collectives changes over long historical 
periods, so too does their mode of perception." 
  The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility 
 
1. Introduction 
In this paper I will give an overview of what can be deemed Walter Benjamin’s 
theory of technology. I will put particular emphasis on what Benjamin defined as the 
“shattering” effect technological progress had on traditional notions of “experience” 
within modern society. Benjamin saw within technology not only a destructive, but 
also a liberating potential. He realized how new technologies could play a vital role in 
reestablishing what he called a new, mimetic “communion with the cosmos”. This 
interaction with nature was for long suppressed by a modern paradigm of progress 
and rationality, and suppressed within the individual through the shock-effect of 
modern life. Through his critique of these aspects of modernity, he forms alternatives 
to the way technology is implemented within the capitalist framework. By alternative 
modes of technological utilization, Benjamin sees possibilities for freeing the masses 
from the constraints of modern capitalist mastery over the proletariat and nature. 
Benjamin saw this as synonymous with revolution. Through harnessing the power of 
the new technologies, Benjamin envisaged that the destructive “shattering” of 
tradition could lead to a potential healing of nature and humanity.  
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Benjamin saw the industrial revolutions of the nineteenth century and the First 
World War as symptomatic of a technological upheaval which deemed the 
continuation of established historical narratives problematic. Benjamin developed 
important aspects of his theory of technology within a zeitgeist of this war, and within 
the post-war Weimar Republic. Arguably one of the most important writers on the 
themes of technology, experience and modernity during this time was Ernst Jünger. I 
will show that Benjamin’s response to Jünger’s embrace of technologically rendered 
destruction and his Fascist aesthetization of war is formative to his own theory of 
technology. Further, I will illustrate how Benjamin viewed the new technologies of 
reproduction as symptomatic to the shattering of tradition. At the same time he saw 
the liberating potential within these technologies being exemplary in relation to 
articulating embodiment with technologies that facilitate collective experience. As a 
possible alternative and liberating way of interacting with technology, I show how the 
concept of mimesis and mimetic innervation incorporates what Benjamin envisaged 
as a possibility of renewed mimetic interaction with the cosmos, through seeing that 
use of technology one can restore the former mimetic sensibility that has become 
numb, or repressed through the shock-effects of modern life. A prominent example of 
such mimetic interaction, I will argue, is found in the mimetic way children engage 
with their surroundings. I will show how Benjamin saw the child’s perception of the 
world as evidence of the presence of the mimetic faculty in modern man, and through 
it a non-instrumental way of relating to technology.  
The writings of Walter Benjamin evade structure and consistency, and are 
characterized by their often problematic interweaving of such disparate themes as 
mysticism, mythology, aesthetics and Marxist insights. An attempt at an exegesis of 
his philosophy of technology faces these problems, and must often sacrifice precision 
for scope. In giving a sufficient room for the central issues in his thinking, I have 
emphasized scope, and have chosen to focus a detailed discussion of a few select 
concepts and themes relevant to the problem at hand, while mentioning other equally 
important aspects of his thinking only in brief.  Starting with an introduction of key 
theoretical aspects discussed in this essay, such historical materialism, the concept of 
experience, technology and mimetic innervation, I will roughly attempt to follow 
Benjamin’s historically founded structure based on his “triadic” story of western 
culture, explicated in To the Planetarium:  1. An original collective “edenic” state of 
harmony with the cosmos, 2. Modernity as technologically rendered catastrophe, or 
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“second Fall”, and 3. A technologically rendered redemption on the basis of this fall, 
or a new cosmic communion through a “second” technology, leading to a classless 
society, or new edenic harmony. 
  In undergoing an analysis of several of Benjamin’s works with emphasis on 
two key texts, One Way Street and The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical 
Reproducibility, I will show how the issue of technological “shattering” of tradition, 
and it’s shock-effect within modernity not only reveals Benjamin’s Kantian, Marxist 
and Freudian influences, but also his utilization of conceptual frameworks found in 
the Judaic Kabbalah. In addition, I will discuss in brief his debt to new revolutionary 
movements in art, such as Surrealism, and his influence from literary sources, such as 
Marcel Proust and Charles Baudelaire. These influences were central in his quest of 
redefining his concept of “experience” within modernity. In them he found inspiration 
for retrieving a form of secular, “ecstatic experience” of the cosmos from an 
instrumental mode of existence. My reading of Benjamin rests on him applying an 
idea of the genuine auratic1 trace being potentially available within this everyday, 
mundane experience. Further, I will attempt to show that it can be traced through how 
reproductive techniques, such as photo and film, invoke the faculty of what he called 
‘the optical unconscious’. This reading of Benjamin’s theory of technology will in its 
entirety indicate what could be seen as an underlying agenda for the entire matrix of 
Benjamin’s complex and often contradictory texts: A rehabilitation of a classical 
aesthetical notion of experience through and because of what he deemed the new 
technologically infused “second nature”. In order to do this, I will introduce how 
Benjamin’s construction of his concept of experience is in fundamental ways a break 
from the tradition of Kantianism and German Idealism in general, and also how this 
break was intrinsically connected with his critique of technological progress in 
modernity. This rehabilitation of experience is based on his understanding of the loss 
of original embodiment with collective experience, schematized through a distinction 
between experience as Erfahrung and Erlebnis. Through defining how Erlebnis is 
manifesting as the predominant form of experience in modernity, I will discuss and 
define his concept if ‘aura’ and how it consists of a genuine trace and false substitutes. 
                                                          
1
 The concept of "aura" refer to the feeling of awe or reverence in relation to unique or remarkable 
objects, artefacts, works of art or relics of historical origin. Benjamin deemed ancient cultures created 
auratic characteristics around objects of veneration. In opposition, capitalist modernity signifies the 
decay of aura, because of the proliferation of mass-replication and reproduction technologies. 
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Being in decay, the aura manifests itself either in its total absence or in decayed, false 
forms within modernity. Through a discussion of such concepts as “shock” and 
“phantasmagoria”, I will put the concept of aura in relief, and show how Benjamin 
attempted to recover traces of its original form, and found it in the contemplation of 
natural forms.  
In connection to this attempt, a reading of his works on film and photographic 
technologies is central. In the last part of the essay I will define Benjamin’s interest in 
these technological forms as coming from a conviction of their political and aesthetic 
potential, and his interest in utilizing this potential to liberate the masses, previously 
repressed by capitalist interests. This liberation is intimately connected with the 
aspiration of a renewed collective communion with the cosmos. Through a 
comparative reading of Artwork Essay in conjunction with the To the Planetarium 
text, I will show how the former is a continuation of the programmatic intentions of 
the latter, with emphasis on the development of the notions of “first” and “second” 
nature, and “first” and “second technology”. The understanding of these terms are 
crucial to grasp his interest in the notion of mimetic innervation, which will be 
defined and discussed in conjunction with his attempt at a restoration of the classical 
concept of mimesis as consisting of both semblance and play. I will further discuss 
how the “second technology” differs from the first due to its origin in mimetic play. 
This play can be viewed as containing a liberating dimensions in the form of an 
increased “field of action” that before was impeded by capitalist interests in 
technology. I will also show how Benjamin connects the liberation of the second 
technology as intrinsically linked with the answer to long-repressed existential 
questions within western culture. These theoretical themes interrelate in what I see as 
Benjamin’s attempt at formulating a solution to the technologically rendered 
alienation that mankind is suffering from in modern society, and this solution involve 
a liberation of the masses through the use of technology. Within such liberation, 
Benjamin sees the possibility of a revolution that he calls “innervations of the 
collective”, and I will try to shed light on what this term refers to. My argument is 
based on what I see as Benjamin’s attempt at mending or re-establishing a renewed 
collective communion with the cosmos through a form of homeopathic effect 
described as innervation, and through innervation induces a form of technological 
Catharsis. I will also suggest that his use of the term Catharsis in relation to Film 
technology may be Aristotelian in nature.  
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Instead of focusing mainly on the well-established dimension of Benjamin’s 
historical materialism and analysis pertaining to historical redemption, I want to 
conclude by posing questions relating to what a reading of Benjamin today can 
present in an attempt to resolve the apparent dichotomies between lived sensuous 
experience and the emerging technologically dominated world.  
As a parenthesis, I should also mention that my intentions in presenting 
Benjamin’s theories in this way are not to pursue a critique of his theory of 
technology. Instead of emphasizing Benjamin’s tendency towards inconsistencies, 
undeveloped lines of reasoning and often opaque and enigmatic language, I will 
restrain my criticism and instead attempt to focus on the often neglected sub-strata of 
coherence, hidden connections, and neglected conceptual relations in his theories. I 
will out of this intention instead invoke a very modest work of mending together in a 
greater mosaic what in Benjamin’s writings is fragmentary and aphoristic, and often 
undeveloped or unfinished2.  
Our relations with technology are often marked with ambivalence. In many 
ways technology defines and structures our reality to such an extent that we feel 
enframed by it. At the same time it is an intrinsic component in our way of perceiving 
this reality. Benjamin saw that through technological change, our ways of perceiving 
reality, our mode of perception must change also. The same can be said of our 
conceptions of past, future and of human nature as such. These problems occupied 
many thinkers in the beginning of the last century. What separates Walter Benjamin 
from his contemporaries is how differently he approached the issue of technology. As 
Susan Buck-Morss emphatically claims, Benjamin’s project has the potential of 
changing the entire conceptual order of modernity. Nothing less: “Benjamin’s critical 
understanding of mass society disrupts the tradition of modernism, (…), by exploding 
the constellation of art, politics and aesthetics into which, by the twentieth century 
this tradition has congealed.”3   
 
 
                                                          
2
 Examples of Benjamin’s unrealized, abandoned or uncompleted projects abound both in his early, 
middle and late period. From his early period, theories of colour, logic, language, epistemology and 
ontology are left undeveloped. Arguably the most prominent of his unrealized works is the Passagen-
werk, a thousand page text of montage-like character, unfinished and unpublished in Benjamin’s 
lifetime. 
3
  Susan Buck-Morss, Aesthetics and Anaesthetics: Walter Benjamin’s Artwork Essay Reconsidered. 
October Magazine, Vol. 62, 1992, p. 5 
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2. The 'Tigers Leap' in history 
For Benjamin the modern age is beset with the consequences of a technological 
evolution marked by "the fact that technology serves this society only by producing 
commodities"4. From this perspective he embarks on an attempt to reveal the forces 
that channels technology down destructive paths, cloaked in what he defined as 
rhetoric of progress, and finally culminating in world wars. When, at the beginning of 
the 20th century, it became apparent for Benjamin that "the speed of traffic and the 
ability of machines to duplicate words and writing outstrip human needs. The energies 
that technology develops beyond this threshold are destructive. First of all, they 
advance the technology of war and its propagandistic preparation."5 Not only 
technological warfare, but the very apparatus that paves the way for such carnage 
thrived on the use of the technologies of reproduction. In these technologies, 
Benjamin saw a process that leads to a "tremendous shattering of tradition, which is 
the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of mankind"6. Bearing witness to 
a deployment of modern technologies against mankind that radically altered history, 
he saw language and public space utilized for propagandistic purposes and 
experience. But Benjamin still believed that mass culture and the technologies of 
mass media ultimately had the power of redemption, making the utopian "classless 
society" an end and the empowerment of the proletariat its means.   
My reading of Benjamin rests on his seeing of the present historically. He read 
the past not as a unified entity or whole, and not as a unified, written narrative. 
Benjamin meant that to see the present, is to see the past in it, due to it being made up 
of the objects of history. To read the present, he dwelled on fragments and isolated 
images from the past which again could be rearranged. Through this way of reading 
the present, history can be a tool of, and resituated within the present.  
Benjamin realized that human perception, our way of experiencing reality, is 
not given, but a product of history. By being temporally anchored, experience 
becomes related to the changes in historical time, and through these changes, mankind 
can potentially become aware of previous unacknowledged dimensions of reality. 
Bridging the gap between the primal past and the future utopia rests heavily on 
                                                          
4
  Walter Benjamin, "Eduard Fuchs, Collector and Historian, Selected Writings, Vol. 3 (abbreviated 
SW1,2,3 below), Cambridge, Mass. and London, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2002, p. 266.  
5
  Ibid, p. 266 
6
 W. Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of Its Reproducibility, Selected Writings Vol. 3, p. 104 
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Benjamin's theory of revolution. Without the redemptive capacity of revolution, the 
possibility of re-establishing an alternative to the alienated capitalist modernity is 
beyond reach. This revolutionary vision is redemptive, and stands in contrast to the 
social-democratic, and vulgar-Marxist myth of progress as self-sufficient, self-
evident, and a harbinger of boundless improvement. Benjamin often refers to Auguste 
Blanqui (1805-1881), the legendary revolutionary fighter who had nothing but scorn 
for the belief in technological progress. The basic presupposition of his activity was 
not this illusory belief but the decision to put an end to present injustice. "This 
decision, at the last moment to pull humanity out of the impending catastrophe which 
threatens it, is precisely for Blanqui, more than for any other revolutionary politician 
of his time, the essential criterion."7 Progress is to be overcome by revolution, as a 
'tigers leap into the past'8. Benjamin does not want a Rousseauian 'return to Nature', 
but instead describes a search for the lost paradise, an edenic harmony between 
human beings, and between humanity and nature. The pre-historical classless societies 
envisioned in the 1935 Exposé of the Passagen-werk was for Benjamin a picture of a 
possible Utopia, where technological development is not running counter the needs of 
mankind. Although this theme toned significantly down in later texts, the theme 
reappear in On Some Motifs in Baudelaire (1939), where one can discover a new 
version of the opposition between present 'hell' and a 'lost paradise'. The central trait 
of this modern ‘hell’ is here the degradation of experience that reveals itself within the 
alienated life of the masses, confined to standardized, 'denatured' existence, and its 
inhospitable, overwhelming nature, as it exists within large scale industrialism. In 
particular the life of the unskilled worker, whose labor 'has been sealed off from 
experience', degraded, standardized, regimented and reduced to automaton by modern 
machinery.9 As a consequence of this conception of modern life as 'hell', we can see a 
basic premise for understanding Benjamin theory of historical materialism, critique of 
progress, and technology in particular; Irving Wohlfarth defined it as his network of 
“mytho-historical” triads10. According to, this structure can be described roughly as 
follows;  
                                                          
7
   W. Benjamin, Illuminations, , Hanna Arendt (Ed.), Trans. Harry Zohn, New York, Cape, 1968 
 p. 262,  
8
    Ibid, p. 263 
9
  Ibid, 158-59, p.178 
10Irving Wohlfarth, Walter Benjamin and The Idea of a Technological Eros, A tentative reading of 
“Zum Planetarium”, in Walter Benjamin, Language, Literature, History, Reinton & Anderson (eds.) 
Solum Forlag, p. 125  
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1. Myth/Paradise: collective, ecstatic communion with the cosmos; 
2. The Fall/Demythologization: bourgeoisie society, Copernican science, Modernity. 
3. Redemption on the basis of the Fall: A redemption of lost communion and community, 
classless society, and a second Copernican turn. In short, this is a post-Kantian integration of 
the cosmic consciousness through a "Second Technology", (i.e. new Physis).11 
 
Bearing in mind that Myth and Paradise is comparable as a preference for the 
makeup, Benjamin is here introducing a reintroduction of mythology within Jewish 
mysticism.12 This feature of his formation of a redeemed technological future is based 
on a redefined Jewish mysticism. As we shall see later, it reveals intent on Benjamin's 
behalf to fuse the secular and the religious dimensions of his thought. This intention 
shows that there cannot be any redemption without revolution. Revolution, as the 
precondition of the creation of a classless society comes through an interruption of 
history, including the uncritical faith in progress. No revolutionary action can happen 
without an understanding of the advent of the classless society as incorporating the 
shattering potential of the Messianic, or as Michael Lövy points out, "as a breaking 
point". Lövy continues: "Benjamin's aim is not revolution for the sake of revolution, 
but for him without revolution there can be no redemption, and without a Messianic-
redemptive view of history, no really radical revolutionary praxis."13  
It may prove fruitful to look closer at Benjamin’s emphasis on viewing history 
as the history of cruelty, repression and barbarism. If this fact remains cloaked in the 
rhetoric of progress of the ruling classes at any given time, its true nature was 
revealed in the two world wars, or in the drudgery of urban life. Benjamin sees this as 
confirmation that truth must be wrested from the ruins of the past, not from the canon 
of conventional history. Benjamin refers to Marx, who stated that the ruling class 
constitutes what becomes the dominating world view, and through this attempt to 
maintain the political status quo. It is because of the conservative way culture is 
transmitted in history that it has a conservative effect. "Culture appears reified. Its 
history then becomes nothing but the residue of memorabilia that have been unearthed 
without ever entering into human consciousness through any authentic, political, 
                                                          
11
  Ibid, p. 125 
12
  Ibid, p. 125 
13
  M. Löwy. Revolution Against 'Progress': Walter Benjamin's Romantic Anarchism, New Left 
Review 152, p. 59 
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experience."14 The purpose of a materialist15 education is to provide this political 
experience, giving the revolutionary class the strength to dispose of those "gems" of 
history that are accumulated in society, "so as to get its hands on them".  
There is no place for upholding the tradition in the materialist vision, and this 
instead creates a consciousness of discontinuity. The fold in the fabric of history is the 
discontinuity of the materialist historian. If all historical continuity is constituted by 
the ruling class, and henceforth by the historical oppressors, the break with this 
pattern means embracing the rupture of tradition. A breakdown of tradition implies 
the possibility of recovering a historical object that reveals "cracks" where one can get 
a hold for anyone wishing to get beyond these points"16 This tradition is one of fresh 
beginnings, or more precisely a realization of the ephemeral character of any stasis in 
history. The classless society is but another facet and form of the historical 
consciousness. It is not the goal, but instead an unsuccessful, yet ultimately 
accomplished interruption.  
In his early period, Benjamin believed in the possibility of metaphysical 
knowledge of the objective world. He insisted that there was “’something perceptibly 
objective in history’”.17 Instead of deeming history meaningful in itself, he saw the 
physical objects of the actual world as containing their historic meaning in them. He 
goes as far as saying that the worldly objects themselves contain the “history of the 
whole world within”. His life long friend Gershom Scholem recorded his “extreme 
formulation”: “A philosophy that does not include the possibility of soothsaying from 
coffee grounds and cannot explicate it cannot be a true philosophy.”18 The materiality 
of physical objects contained within them the ‘absolute’, or the truth of the entire 
universe, much like Leibniz monads.19 The physical objects themselves did not speak, 
but their potential for expressing the meaning contained in them was actualized by the 
philosopher who translated, or “named” them.  
Benjamin meant that through translating this potential into human language of 
                                                          
14
  W. Benjamin, Eduard Fuchs, Collector and historian. SW3, p. 267 
15
  Materialism, in Benjamin’s sense, refers to the understanding of the sensuous, non-conceptual 
dimensions of reality. 
16
  W. Benjamin, On the Concept of History, Illuminations. Hannah Arendt (ed), trans. Harry Zohn, 
New York, 1968 p. 265 
17
  S. Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, Walter Benjamin and the  
Arcades Project, Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1989, p. 13. 
18
 Gershom Sholem, Walter Benjamin: The story of a Friendship. In On Walter Benjamin, Critical 
Essays and Recollections, Gary Smith (Ed.), Cambridge Mass., and London, England, The MIT Press, 
1988, p. 59 
19
  Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience, p. 8. 
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words, the objects were brought to speech. Hence, this reading “was to read what was 
never written”20. This speech was historical in nature, as it contained the history of 
their objects. Not only do the objects “speak” to us, they are mimetic in character. 
Thus, Benjamin sees them as naturally corresponding to the mimetic faculty in man:  
 
But these natural correspondences are given their true importance only if we see that they, one 
and all, are stimulants and awakeners of the mimetic faculty which answers them in man. It 
must be borne in mind that neither mimetic powers nor mimetic objects remain the same in the 
course of thousands of years. Rather, we must suppose that the gift for producing similarities 
(…), and therefore also the gift of recognizing them, have changed in the course of history.21 
 
In the short text On the mimetic Faculty, Benjamin develop genealogies of perception 
as reading. Such reading is the most ancient: reading before all languages, from the 
entrails, the stars, or dances”22. The transformation from reading “what was never 
written”, to the written language of man is one of infinitely many examples of ‘decay’ 
or ‘transformation’ of particular configurations of experience. Written language is for 
him an example of a mimetic transformation – a transformation into “the most perfect 
archive of non sensuous similarity”23. This is the archive to which Benjamin chooses 
to dedicate himself, and an archive that is bound by its historical nature.  
History therefore becomes a collection of facts or objects, and not a canon of 
linear time. Instead, the present moment has within it all of history, and historical 
materialism is the science of creating a philosophy out of history. This means to 
reconstruct historical material as philosophy. According to Benjamin, historical 
changes accommodate what he defines as a dialectical perception of history. In short; 
the present, due to its changeable nature, creates possibilities for redeeming 
dimensions of reality through being in flux. With flux comes disruption and upheaval, 
and through upheaval an opportunity to look at reality in a new way emerges. This 
new way of perceiving reality is not self-evident. It emerges as humanity is forced to 
look at what we previously took for granted, or what was previously axiomatic, or 
given. Thus, in Benjamin's vision, the masses can be made aware of previously 
unconscious aspects of reality through making them aware of the past; "The 
alignment of reality with the masses and of the masses with reality is a process of 
                                                          
20
  W. Benjamin, On the Mimetic Faculty, SW2, p. 722 
21
 Ibid, p. 720 
22
 Ibid, p. 722 
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immeasurable importance for both thinking and perception."24  
This mutual alignment resides as an underlying agenda permeating his theory of 
experience, and his theory of technology in particular. In reading Benjamin we, as 
readers are challenged by the fact that Benjamin’s texts themselves are now part of 
history, and in a fluke of irony, through Benjamin’s emphasis on actuality, may also 
be seen as outdated. But perhaps a closer look at what can be salvaged of Benjamin 
can teach us something more about our present age. 
Through our perception, we actively create the world. Benjamin stated it 
enigmatically: “Perception is reading”25. We experience the world through actively 
reading it. As Sholem noted later, Benjamin early on “occupied himself with ideas 
about perception as a reading in the configurations of the surface – which is the way 
prehistoric man perceived the world around him, particularly the sky.”26 
How should we then read Benjamin? After being introduced to his historically 
grounded thinking, our reading may be elicited when facing our present discussion: 
By way of introduction, consider the following four terms, interlinked and mutually 
dependent; Experience, Shattering, Technology, and Mimesis. 
 
3. The Concept of Experience  
To grasp Benjamin's emphasis on technology's role in the destruction of traditional 
experience, we now need to turn to one of his most fundamental and ongoing 
problems; his notion of the concept of experience. Experience is a critical category in 
Benjamin's thought, arguably the most important one. He develops a dialectical 
relation between two already existing types of experience within the Germanic 
philosophical tradition: Erfahrung and Erlebnis. To understand his use of these 
concepts and to grasp their significance within his notion of the shattering of 
traditional experience, we need to look closer at Benjamin's early period of 
production, where he launches a radical critique of the Kantian concept of experience, 
and how he found it "limited" in scope. 
Erfahrung is the tradition-bound type of experience, unfolding over time, 
                                                                                                                                                                      
23
 Ibid, p. 722 
24
  Walter Benjamin, The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility, SW1, p. 105. 
25
 W. Benjamin, On Perception, SW1, p. 93 
26
 Gershom Sholem, Walter Benjamin, History of a Friendship, On Walter Benjamin, Critical Essays 
and Recollections, Gary Smith (ed.), MIT Press, 1988 p. 61 
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being inseparable from the representation of continuity, and is inherently sequential.27 
Erlebnis refers to the isolated, immediate individual experience, detached from 
tradition or historical origin. Neo-Kantian and empirical schools of thought 
emphasized the former, due to the fact that it stresses the outer sensory stimuli and 
conceptual reflection on objective experience, making for a more rounded, coherent 
narrative out of experience. The latter became understood as more subjective, inner 
experience, infused with romantic notions originating with Goethe, Dilthey and 
others. Benjamin has initial objections to both concepts, developing instead a dialectic 
between these two varieties of experience, in an attempt to overcome their subject-
object distinction. It is important to note at this point that Benjamin's emphasis on this 
dialectical tension never escapes the historical, material conditions of the human 
sensorium. As mentioned above, Benjamin always argued the historical nature of 
perception and experience. He stresses this basic historical perspective, and in 
particular with reference to how perception is constantly being altered by 
technological change.  
The young Benjamin remained critical towards the philosophical debates of 
his time. Although deeply engaged in philosophical questions throughout his early 
writings, the canon of “bourgeois philosophical texts in no way inspired his obedient 
respect.”28 It is clear from his early writings that two of the main philosophical 
traditions that he is referring to is Kantianism and Hegelianism. In early works such 
as The Life of Students, and The Metaphysics of Youth, a complex but fascinating 
series of inversions of the philosophical problems in vogue in his time is explicated. 
What appeared out of these early texts was something approaching a non-Hegelian 
account of speculative experience. What is most striking is the emphasis Benjamin 
laid on the conviction that there is an immanent perfection residing in even the most 
neglected dimensions of experience. This signals a move away from the Hegelian 
absolute idealism which rejects the present in the name of an absolute idea, towards a 
materialism that unravels the absolute in what is rejected by the present order.29 
Immanuel Kant is a key figure in Benjamin's intellectual life, delineating various 
types of knowledge through his three critiques and trying to give an account of 
                                                          
27
  Brent S. Plate. Walter Benjamin, Religion and Aesthetics, p. 5 
28
  Susan Buck-Morss, Dialectics of Seeing, p. 10 
29
  H. Caygill, Walter Benjamin, The Colour of Experience, Walter Benjamin, The Color of 
Experience, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 9 
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knowledge separate from any type of experiential realm. Yet, Susan Buck Morss 
explains his relationship to the sensual dimension of experience in this way: "Kant's 
transcendental subject purges himself of the senses which endanger autonomy not 
only because they unavoidably entangle him in the world, but, specifically because 
they make him passive (languid), instead of active (vigorous), susceptible, like 
'oriental voluptuaries', to sympathy and tears."30 Benjamin's philosophy cannot be 
reduced to any reaction "against" theories that preceded him, but in Kant's attempt to 
find a non-sensuous, apriori ground for experience his theory of experience may be 
seen as an immanent critique. It is here that we must look to find a source of his later 
emphasis on traditional experience, and the role of technological progress as 
inherently destructive. As early as 1916 had Benjamin made "immoderate attacks on 
Kant" and "considered his theory of experience impoverished"31.    
All of Benjamin's writings may be read as anticipations of a 'coming 
philosophy'. In its core, this new philosophy is a radical transformation of the concept 
of experience established by the Kantian critical philosophy. In his early works, 
limited to a small number of published texts and unpublished fragments from the 
period between 1914 and 1921, this transformation is expounded32. In these texts 
Benjamin established a foundation for his later academic interest, and they are crucial 
to understand the interpretation of his entire oeuvre. Here he distanced himself from 
the neo-Kantianism which dominated his academic environment during his student 
years. His thought developed toward a recasting of Kant's transcendental conception 
of experience into a speculative one. His own philosophical aspiration was directed 
towards an introduction of “the absolute" or "infinite" into the Kantian "finite" 
conception of experience. Since a thorough examination of the complexity of 
Benjamin's early philosophical works is beyond the scope of this essay, many nuances 
of his conception of experience cannot be examined. It is sufficient to note that many 
assume Benjamin's philosophy to be a philosophy of language, and that it is above all 
a linguistic meta-critique of Kant.33 These objections fail to recognize the complexity 
of Benjamin's conception of experience as not exclusively linguistic. Instead, his 
transcendental but speculative philosophy is pointing towards an account of 
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experience characterized by an immanent totality.34 
  The project of recasting this concept of experience runs through Benjamin's 
early work. In the 1917 text On Perception and the 1918 text On the Programme of 
the Coming Philosophy this task is made explicit. In these texts he not only launches a 
critique of the notion of experience itself, but also Kant's basic belief in the distinction 
of subject and object. Further, he questions the assumption that there can be no true 
experience of the absolute. This critique is not only an inherent challenge to the 
established norms of the reading of Kantian philosophy, but towards the defining 
boundaries of philosophy itself. Kant's thought is marked by his emphasis on the 
limits of possible experience as set up by the faculty of intuition, understanding and 
reason. In The Critique of Pure Reason, he places as belonging to intuition the pure 
forms of intuition; space and time. The understanding consists of 12 categories, 
among them causality, limitation, substance, unity and plurality. To reason belong the 
Ideas of Reason; The World, God, the Soul.35 These different faculties are defined as 
separate and Kant emphasizes their separateness in their contribution to experience. In 
Benjamin's critique of Kant, however, he insisted that there is a possibility of a 
connection between intuition and understanding. This connection ultimately 
culminates in a concept of experience where not only the distinction between the 
intuition and understand is suspended, but an entirely new 'speculative' concept of 
experience emerges.36 The Kantian concepts of the intuition, understanding and 
reason are redefined into a concept of experience where the absolute manifests itself 
indirectly within spatio-temporal experience. Unlike Kant who excluded the absolute 
from all realms of knowledge except moral knowledge, he welcomes the concept of 
the absolute. Why? In short, experience, for Benjamin, is able to contain both 
categorical universality and rational totality.37 This is possible due to his underlying 
intention of recasting Kant's transcendental philosophy of experience onto a 
speculative yet transcendental philosophy. The recasting must take into account the 
very structure of Kant's concept of experience, and address its problematic aspects. If 
a recasting of the distinction between intuition, concept and idea is to be made, 
Benjamin needs to show that totality, expressed within the ideas of reason, emerges 
within both intuition and concepts. In short, his early attempt at recasting Kant's 
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concept of experience was mainly a critique of a limiting philosophical framework, 
and as a consequence, he wished to transgress the limits of this Kantian framework, 
by introducing the experience of the absolute into the new philosophical space. This 
would become space where the Kantian triadic structure of reason, understanding and 
intuition is one of an infinite number of possible surfaces of experience. To do this it 
was necessary to redefine the Kantian topology. This implies a redefinition of infinity 
and totality in relation to the forms of intuition, space and time. In On Perception, he 
criticizes Kant for not being able to distinguish "Knowledge of experience" and 
"experience" as such:  
 
The confusion arose from conflating the concepts of "experience" and "knowledge of 
experience". For the concept of knowledge, experience is not anything new and extraneous to 
it, but only itself in a different form; experience as the object of knowledge is the unified and 
continuous manifold of knowledge.38 
 
Benjamin's speculative redefinition of Kant's transcendental description of experience 
involves the introduction of the absolute or infinite into the structure of forms of 
intuition - space and time - and the linguistic categories of the understanding. 
Benjamin attempted to avoid Kant's demarcation of experience, and instead 
introduced a concept of experience where the absolute was an immanent component. 
This was attempted by a new definition of the spatio temporal and linguistic realms. 
These realms were regarded as discrete configurations through which the absolute 
manifested itself in patterns, breaks and distortions. The Kantian concepts of space 
and time, and the categories and judgments, where seen as unbalanced and limiting in 
a deep way.  
Fused with his notion of the limitations of the Kantian conception of 
experience was a growing conviction in Benjamin's thinking that these limitations 
were inherent in philosophy itself. The critique of Kant's philosophy implies for him a 
redefinition of how philosophy itself need not be restricted to philosophy as subject 
matter39, but instead extend its scope to include such subjects as art, literature, and 
culturally related issues in general. The limits of experience would be expanded in 
such a way that philosophy as a critical activity, or reflection could move beyond 
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what traditionally would denote a "philosophical" subject matter, as proclaimed in his 
On the Programme for the Coming Philosophy: 
 
The decisive mistakes of Kant's epistemology are, without at doubt, traceable to the 
hollowness of the experience available to him, and thus the double task of creating both a new 
concept of knowledge and a new conception of the world on the basis of philosophy becomes 
a single one.40 
 
The Kantian concept of experience is based on a Newtonian paradigm, and it's 
foundation in physics. This mechanistic world-view is rejected by Benjamin, and 
criticizes the way Kant points to science and reduces the field of experience to "a 
nadir, to a minimum of significance"41 Benjamin objects to the way Kant scarifies 
scope for certainty. In line with the Enlightenment, the Kantian notion of the limits of 
certain knowledge excludes entire fields of inquiry from potential philosophical 
significance. “Experience” as a concept rested on the mechanistic model of bodies in 
motion, or objects, perceived by a subject. Metaphysics is rendered as outside the 
field of legitimate knowledge. Does Benjamin embrace metaphysics anew? He turns 
the question around and states that within the very core of the Kantian notion of 
sensuous or intellectual knowledge lays an equally metaphysical or mythological set 
of ideas:  
 
In this respect, so far as the naive conception of the receipt of perceptions concerned, Kantian 
"experience" is metaphysics or mythology, and indeed only a modern and religiously very 
fertile one42 
 
Kant's notion of distinction between subject and object is parochial, and is only one of 
many possible dimensions of experience. It is mythology in the same manner as 
totemism, and the experiences of the psychotic or clairvoyant. In contrast to the 
mechanistically oriented metaphysics of the Kantian tradition, Benjamin sought the 
intoxication of cosmic experience43. For him, this was experience in the truest 
philosophical conception of the word, as a conception that included a vast scope of 
possible realms of experience, previously defined as un-philosophical. Thus, a new 
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and redefined concept of experience would for Benjamin entail possibilities for a new 
metaphysics.  
The critique of modern experience in the theoretical philosophy developed in 
his later writings as an exploration of the possibilities for freedom present within a 
decaying modern experience. In his On the Programme of the Coming Philosophy, 
Benjamin identifies the "lower and inferior nature of experience" characteristic of the 
entire enlightenment era, as identical with that of the modern era. In an attempt to 
understand and analyze the process of decay he hoped to better understand the nature 
of the limits of the modern experience. Through this process, he attempted to establish 
what possibilities of new freedom that lay dormant within this cultural dissolution. 
The way Benjamin attempted such an analysis was not merely to discuss and establish 
a critique of modernity as such, but instead to come to an understanding of the 
reactive and destructive elements within it, and through this reveal the inherent 
potential that lay dormant within element of modernity; elements that further could be 
redefined, transformed and made useful.  
Benjamin saw the modern world as brought about through the triumph of 
rationality and visuality, or an "exclusive emphasis on the optical connection to the 
universe".44 The modern world's most influential product - the printed text - has 
severed the ties to a more total experience of the universe, and a grander, more 
complete cosmological understanding. It is in line with Benjamin's reasoning to see 
the world as brought in line by sensory priorities through creating a technologically 
rendered visual spectacle of the cosmos. Interestingly, Benjamin often used the 
language of science and technology, but more for its rhetorical power and authority 
derived from scientific method. Developmental tendencies within history and modern 
culture dissolve aesthetics into a science and further into technologies and techniques. 
This reliance on a technophile, scientific discourse came from the influences of Soviet 
cultural avant-gardism. Various avant-garde artistic movements were immersed in the 
problems and discourse of science and technology in post-revolutionary Russia in the 
wake of 1917.45  The Soviet Union became a “testing ground for Benjamin’s research 
into the intersecting themes of social and natural sciences, and saw the Soviet Union 
as indicative for the potential direction of the political development in Western 
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Europe. Starting with One Way Street and culminating in the 1935 Exposé for the 
Passagen-werk, Benjamin investigates how experience and consciousness are 
redefined “in light of the new technical and social reality”, and at the same time how 
the new technologies become “an expression of a new attitude towards life.”46 Indeed, 
the new technological reality imposes on mankind an experience of a new “second” 
nature. As such, no absolute categorical distinction between nature and technology 
persists. These new cultural forms, he contends, necessitates a revolution in the realm 
of aesthetics. This revolution in the relationship between art and technology are 
expressions of this “new attitude”. By employing new forms of production in the 
aesthetic realm, novel forms of social existence can be experimented with. These new 
forms of existence rely on the “elective affinity” between technology and humanity, 
and art is the realm where this elective affinity can be played out.47 S. Brent Plate 
views Benjamin's entire project as an attempt at an aesthetic re-evaluation of 
experience.48 Through its decay or ruin, the aesthetic was able to actualize an 
additional dimension of his engagement with experience which became increasingly 
important to Benjamin, namely the transformation of experience in technology.  
What does this re-evaluation of experience indicate? Western Philosophy and 
theology’s search for truth has almost entirely been limited to the transcendent and/or 
spiritual, and thus opposed to the material. Reason, in the Kantian sense, guarantees 
limits and structures, aims for unity, and situates the reasoning subject in control. A 
way to exert control over its object of study is for the reasoning subject to maintain 
clear distinctions. These distinctions clearly reveal themselves in the mind-body 
dualism that can be seen as the key contributing factor to the denigration of the field 
of aesthetics.49 In the western tradition, the realm of aesthetics must be appropriated 
by the mind and retained within the grasp of reason and logic. If not, the subject 
matter may be rejected as unimportant for truth. Keeping Benjamin’s goal of recasting 
Kant’s philosophy in mind, he disproves Kant’s attempt to account for knowledge 
separate from experience.  
To better grasp what Benjamin is getting at, it will prove helpful to recall the 
original etymological meaning of "aesthetics", as the source of his recasting of 
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experience is also to be found at its origin. Aisthitikos is the ancient Greek word for 
what is "perceptive by feeling. Aisthisis denotes the sensory experience of perception. 
Thus, it is reality, as bodily, physical nature that originally referred to the field of 
aesthetics, not art. The body, through its sense faculties, was the realm of aesthetics. 
In short, the aesthetic is a form of cognition. As the sense faculties are all situated on 
the surface of the body, they are also the interface, or mediating boundary between the 
inner and outer reality, between the micro and macrocosm. Functioning mainly 
autonomously, prior to conscious cognition, the senses are "out of the mind", as they 
encounter the world pre-linguistically.50 Even though the senses can be cultivated, 
there remains the fact that this occurs a posteriori (as in moral sensibilities, refinement 
of "taste", and sensitivity to norms of beauty). By their psycho-physical makeup, they 
resist cultural domestication, in their function; they are marked by their immediacy, as 
they serve the instinctual need for the survival and self-preservation. Why then is this 
the starting point for Benjamin as he embarks on a redefinition of experience within 
modernity? Susan Buck-Morss points to the fact that within modernity, a reversal in 
meaning of the term "aesthetics" occurred.51 In Benjamin's time it mainly applied to 
the arts, not to sensible experience, and conversely to the imaginary, not the empirical 
world. Returning to Kant, we see in his Critique of Pure Reason, how the "aesthetic" 
in judgment have little emphasis on the sensory experience.  
Benjamin does not clearly fit the bill of an aesthetician. Instead we need to ask 
ourselves why Benjamin put such emphasis on the materialistic, sensuous dimensions 
of reality. As seen above, he retains a materialistic understanding of aesthetics by 
maintaining their link to sensual perception, while also maintaining the connection 
between art and everyday life. This connection was leading to a “new, dynamic, 
dialectical aesthetics”52. This method towards a reading of modernity builds on 
Benjamin's conception of the traumatic impact of the First World War and how this 
event undermined the possibility of a recapitulation within the bounds of tradition. 
The impact of "one of the most monstrous experiences of world history"53 destroyed 
all possibility of making this experience available as passing through tradition. 
Benjamin saw that this destruction could reveal the seeds of new potential 
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experiences, as these new conditions for experience were constituted by a transformed 
reality where technology played a key role. This new situation was seen as a new 
form of "barbarism", and within it rested potential for liberation and destruction, 
manifesting itself through the face of technology.  
 
4. The notion of shattering 
Many commentators on Benjamin have leaned towards an emphasis on the materialist 
and Marxist strands in his theory when shedding light on the origin of his critique of 
modernity and western culture. In his theory of technology, these strands become 
apparent when trying to piece together his theory of technology. Within Marxist 
dialectic, the notion of shattering appears vividly as new forces of production blast 
open old relations of production. The revolutionary goal of this dynamic becomes 
sidetracked, or diverted into unwholesome, or “unnatural”, counter-revolutionary 
pathways in war. Yet much of what has been written on Benjamin's theory of 
aesthetics, and politics culminates in frustration as the disparate strands of his thought 
are seldom coherent and more often contradictory and ending in inconsistency. To 
understand the apparent inconsistencies, a more in-depth reading of his early 
influences from Jewish philosophy is paramount.  
Walter Benjamin's entire intellectual project rests on the notion of a shattering, 
or rupture, of the spatial and temporal realm. The former being grounded in his 
critique of the Kantian concept of experience, while the other borrows heavily on 
Jewish mysticism and the Kabbalistic conceptual realm in particular. The destruction 
of continuity is distinct from total annihilation and dispersal "by the winds of history". 
Instead shattering implies an unsettling event or process, where things are "broken 
into pieces". Thus, Benjamin’s conception of modernity, and his critique of 
technological progress is implicit with a disruption of continuous historical, 
epistemological and ontological narratives. Further, this notion of "rupture" is 
different from "destruction". Instead, the notion of "shock", which is marked by "the 
experience of the collapse of what was, yet without being lost to the future"54 to 
Benjamin remains essential to the modern. The shock-experience disperses the auratic 
experience, creating a new perception of reality, manifesting itself in the arenas of 
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aesthetics, politics, technology and urbanity.  
To Benjamin, the modern is dominated by the ephemeral, transient and ever-
new forms of capitalist industrialism. The ever-new character of the products of 
technological progress leaves in its wake the realization of temporality residing within 
these forms. Thus, the outmoded, the out-of-date, is the dialectical necessity of what 
we herald as "modern". Being outmoded, the ruins of the recent past, appears as 
residues of "a dream world". Susan Buck-Morss characterizes the disintegration of 
cultural forms as "endemic to modernity"55. As mentioned, modernity is characterized 
by the shock-experience. Based partially on Sigmund Freud's theory of war neurosis, 
Benjamin claim was that this battlefield experience had become the norm of urban 
life, and modernity in general. Freud's theory implied that consciousness prevents the 
shock-experience from entering deeply into the human sensory system, so not to leave 
permanent traces in memory. Within the poetry of Charles Baudelaire, he found a 
recording of this "breakdown", or “shattering” of experience, placing it at the core of 
his artistic work.56 Moreover, Freud is a fertile source of ideas with regards to the 
emphasis Benjamin put on the history of the concept of mimesis. 
 
5. Mending the shattered Vessel 
In Theses on the Philosophy of History the historical materialist57 shatters, or blasts an 
epoch of history out of historical continuum, a particular life out of this epoch, and a 
particular work out of this life’s work.58 As briefly mentioned in the introduction, the 
key to such a monadology lies in the implicit dimension of correspondence between 
micro and macro levels of reality. In short, the singular, shattered piece is in itself a 
whole, incorporating the larger entity from which it came. As such, each broken part 
is part of a Leibnizian monad. More directly, the way Benjamin applies this analogy 
aligns with the “shard” or “crystal” of Jewish Messianism.59 
It has been noted that Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of History has 
share similarities with Judaism. This is evident in his conception of a momentary 
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"standstill" of history. Here fragments of the past are remembered through a moment 
of forgetting. This conception, when linked with history, points to a possibility of 
redemption in the "presence of the now". Benjamin rests his understanding of 
historical materialism on the conception of history as “monodological”. This implies 
that singular events in history are “inspirited” by a transcendental and meaningful 
presence to be understood only through a redeemed mankind. This understanding of 
the “redeeming” potential of history reveals Benjamin’s debt to the tradition of 
Judaism.  As noted by his life-long friend and scholar of the Kabbalah, Gershom 
Sholem, "the intimate inter-weaving of Marxist and cosmic-mystical insights which 
penetrate each other, or appear alongside the other...” seemingly connected by 
dialectic.60  
The significant point for Benjamin is to valorize catastrophe rather than trying 
to heal it. In embracing the destructive character of the events, he attempted to defeat 
the catastrophe from within. In Benjamin’s schema, any act of creation actually 
entails destruction. He shares this theme with Freud, articulated as the “death-drive” 
and its evolution towards homeostasis, and also the Surrealists focus on undermining 
boundaries between art and life.61 This resembles the Jewish messianic tradition that 
his friend Scholem had shown often promoted mystical transgression as a means of 
redemption. The Kabbalah proved an important influence already for the young 
Benjamin, and influenced his writings in such key texts as the Origin of the German 
Mourningplay; a study of the German Baroque "Trauerspiel". Buck-Morss 
emphasizes the importance of what strong influence the Kabbalah had for Benjamin's 
thought and the study of Baroque "Trauerspiel" drama in particular:   
 
Kabbalist thought...provided an alternative to the philosophical antinomies of not only 
Baroque Christian theology, but also subjective idealism, its secular Enlightenment form. 
Specifically, Kabbalism avoided the split between spirit and matter which had resulted in the 
Baroque dramatists' "treacherous" abandonment of nature, and it rejected the notion that 
redemption was an anti-material, otherworldly concern.62  
 
In the Kabbalah, Benjamin found a much needed alternative hermeneutical tool to 
mold his thoughts into a genuinely radical alternative to philosophical tradition. 
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Messianism showed tendencies of being collective, historical and materialist. These 
dimensions of the ancient texts created a unique theoretical surface for novel 
theoretical and political inscription, and fitted nicely with Marxism. Communism and 
Messianism both had redemptive agendas, and had both a foundation in conceptions 
of a future "land of plenty", where Messianism upheld an idea of new paradisiacal 
earth, Marxism aspired to a new, classless society.   
To understand the specific philosophical conviction of Benjamin's works and 
on technology in particular, we need to understand how the Kabbalistic and 
theological structure permeates his analysis of the most profane phenomena of 
modern society. Siding with Buck-Morss, his entire oeuvre, and the Passagen-werk in 
particular "is only arbitrary and aesthetic, carrying no philosophical conviction, if the 
invisible theological armature is ignored."63  What then, is Kabbalah for Benjamin? 
Benjamin’s theory of technology reveals the dialectic between the two intimately 
related concepts of dissemination, fragmentation of dispersal (die Zerstreung) and 
collection, assemblage, gathering together (die Sammlung). This dialectical 
constellation reveals itself, and has clear resemblances to the Kabbalistic notions of 
Shevira (fragmentation) and Tikkun (mending). In addition, the concept of decay, or 
withdrawal, related to the concept of aura and the “mimetic character” also can find 
its Kabbalistic counterpart in the term Tzimtzum (withdrawal, reduction). Through the 
action of Tzimtzum the wholeness of God is sacrificed.64  
Being an inherent part of traditional Jewish metaphysics and theology, The 
Kabbalah differs drastically from the entire tradition of idealist philosophy. Although 
being first and foremost a hermeneutic method of reading sacred texts, its nature is 
that of a meta-perspective on reading meaning out of tradition. The meanings found 
within the texts studied are often of such a nature that they could not have been 
known at the time of their writing. This mirrors Benjamin’s own emphasis of 
dialectical images as an alternative way of reading history, where traditionally, 
historical reading is viewed as an attempt to reveal the intent of the author. Instead the 
Kabbalist focuses on inventing meaning, often remote from the established and 
recognized "correct" readings. The main emphasis is to look for keys in the text which 
illuminate the time they presently live in, and through these keys unravel clues of a 
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coming Messianic Age. Accordingly, the present reality, being imbued with an all-
together new conceptual horizon, transforms the way of reading the ancient texts. Put 
in another way, the Kabbalah "reverses the past in order to break from it."65  
According to the Messianic idea, human suffering, which began with the Fall 
from Paradise, will come to an end with the new age. This age is named the Age of 
Redemption, where nature is restored to its paradisiacal state. The return to Paradise is 
not envisioned in any literal way. In fact, the truth of the Kabalistic teachings are to be 
manifested in these "latter days", as the conditions for the ripening of the Myth of 
Paradise are to be revealed for the first time in history. These truths emerge with the 
advent of the new age, as the hidden meanings within the texts are to be unlocked 
with their connotations to singular historical phenomena, in unique ways. According 
to the Kabbalist theory, Adam and Eve are the parents of humanity, and due to this 
fact, Messianic redemption is viewed not only as an event which will end the "exile" 
of the Jews, but rather as a universal in significance: a sign of the total transmutation 
of cosmos. Human beings, and not divine intervention, are the key to realizing the 
ideal of the Messianic Age. There is no inherent mechanism within history that pushes 
history forward, towards the redemption. The coming of the Messiah is not 
synonymous with the coming of a redeemer. The sole responsibility for redemption 
rests on humanity. As historical agents, humans are not powerless components within 
a divine plan, but instead indispensable and powerful agents of the enactment of the 
divine principle, and the powers of creation. Man is the key to the perfection of 
Cosmos, due to being the sole species on the earth endowed with free will. 
Man need not be reconciled with a God that is separated and lost to him. 
Instead, the Kabbalist view Man as alienated to God by Ignorance, and not separation. 
The material Nature is the source of Divine knowledge, and therefore where the 
relationship between God and creation is to be found. Nature, for the Kabbalist, is 
fragmented and shattered, but not a source of Sin or Evil. This means that knowledge 
of God is uncovered by mending the fragments of divine "sparks" that were spread 
throughout the world at the shattering of the divine Vessel (Tikkun)66. The task that 
Man and God must finish together is the healing and mending of the broken vessels of 
Divine Attributes. A new order is established where there before was unrest and 
suffering. Thus universal harmony is created, not as a return to Paradise, but as a 
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creative act of novelty. 67 In Kabbalist creation myths the primordial abstraction of 
God (Ein-Sof) is originally void. It gives up its wholeness, reduces or subtracts itself 
as Tzimtzum. Through this reduction of wholeness, a space emerges where the world 
(Olam) can come into existence. In this process, God fills the void left by his 
withdrawal with divine light, condensed into various forms, or vessels. These vessels 
or forms are emanations of God, and denotes the divine attributes (wisdom, love, etc). 
In addition, these emanations are also connected to other formations, both divine and 
material. The most prominent formation is the inherent relation between the micro 
and macrocosm of the human body and the universe. Thus, these processes of both 
divine and material nature influenced Benjamin in his early period, giving inspirations 
to his emphasis on the conviction that to understand the bodily mimetic interactions to 
the outside world is to gain knowledge of the universe. The divine light is shattered in 
the breaking of the Vessel, leaving divine sparks to scatter throughout the material 
world. As we shall see these notions connect with Benjamin’s notions of 
fragmentation, ruin, catastrophe and destruction of aura. Benjamin sees the ruins and 
catastrophe as inherently constructive in their state of “clearing space” for the tikkun, 
or mending of the world that is to come.68 Keeping these conceptual influences in 
mind, the task of depicting Benjamin’s analysis of modernity and technology in 
particular may gain more potential for clarification. In particular, the mythology of the 
modern world interested Benjamin. The industrialization and technologization of our 
bodies induces a separation from our material bodies. This happens as modern 
technologies create a substitution of the bodily senses, culminating in a world 
unaware of its own ruined or fragmented nature. Benjamin saw this as happening in 
the mass-mediated myths in modernity, and through the continuation of these myths, 
technological destruction became unrecognized until its consequence was inevitable. 
One such consequence was war. 
 
6. The Nature of Technology 
Being a relatively recent phenomenon, the philosophical treatment of technology is 
marked by its short history. The first work to specifically treat technology in a 
philosophical context was by Ernst Knapp, who wrote Grundlinien einer Philosophie 
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der Technik in 187769. But the impact of technology on nature and man is as old as 
history itself. More strikingly, the impact of our use of these skills or tools, even in 
the remote past, is now starting to be recognized. Nearly all areas of human habitation 
throughout history have to a large or small degree left lasting imprints on the 
environment.70  As a consequence, Benjamin realized that the notion of a “pure” 
untouched nature needed to be replaced by the understanding of the interrelation 
between man and nature.  
The impulse to theorize over technology is part of a greater project for 
Benjamin. Mainly, the critique of modernity implies a critique of the economic, 
political and social disruption of that which remains alien, foreign and dissimilar. In 
short, Benjamin's writings seek through numerous ways to suspend the intrinsic value 
of continuity within the modern paradigm, upheld by the idea of economic progress, 
bourgeoisie values and power structures. More specifically, the technological analysis 
is part of a grand project to "re-imagine the aesthetic - in response to the technically 
changed sensorium, to be sure, but in a desperate effort to reassess, and redefine, the 
conditions of experience, affectivity, memory and the imagination".71 For Benjamin 
this relates to a radical suspension of the subject-object dichotomy residing with the 
Kantian tradition, and further, to undermine the porous line of demarcation between 
spirit and matter on which the Hegelian tradition rests. From the outset, the concept of 
"Second Technology" implies a radical potential for a new, redeemed relationship 
between Physis and Techne, between nature and artifact, man and machine that is 
more in line with the actuality of his own urbanized life-world. To what extent is there 
a way "out" of the impasse of technological barbarism apparent in the 20th century? I 
will try to argue for a reading of Benjamin that sees our technologically infused 
cosmos as irreversible and necessary. The apparatus is already implanted in our 
common subjectivity and consequently there is no solution to a potential 
technological destruction without taking technology as playing an important role. 
Benjamin's vision has taken the shattering of tradition into account, and technology's 
power is not to be rejected or considered detrimental to society. Instead we need to 
find ways to re-channel this power into new and creative paths. How different his 
thinking is can be seen in how we can discern a more complex and ambivalent 
                                                          
69
  Don Ihde, Consequences of Phenomenology, p. 79 
70
  Ibid,, p. 80 
71
  Miriam Hansen, Benjamin and Cinema; Not a One-way Street, Critical Inquiry, Vol. 25 p. 325 
  
 
 
29 
conception of the relation between Techne and Physis than in many of his 
contemporary theorists of technology. In many areas of the philosophy of technology, 
as Techne, is seen as either expanding or devaluing human existence. A satisfactory 
discussion of this vast subject is beyond the scope of this study. A short résumé of 
Andrew Feenberg’s distinction between “instrumental” and “substantive” theories of 
technology is sufficient. Feenberg argues that instrumental theory gives us the most 
recognized view of technology; Technologies are “tools” standing ready to serve the 
purpose of their users, without valuative content of its own, and these theories are 
dominant in the social sciences. Substantive theories, best known through the writings 
of Heidegger argues that technologies constitute a new type of cultural system that 
reorganizes the entire social world as an object of control. Technology is seen as 
defining reality in such an instrumental way that society is destined to be consumed 
by it, and therefore cannot be channeled into alternative ways of implementation. This 
implies a deterministic conception of technology. An additional philosophical 
perspective on technology comes from the Frankfurt school, of which Benjamin had 
close connections. Thinkers as Adorno, Horckheimer and Marcuse initiated an 
alternative critical theory of technology. This perspective analyzes the new forms of 
oppression connected with modernity, industrialism, and capitalism, and that these 
cultural forms offer new political and theoretical challenges. As its main area of 
research, these theories faced the challenge of how modern technology may be 
redesigned towards meeting the needs for a new and liberated society. 72 Critical 
theory approaches similar perspectives on the relationship between art, politics, 
technology and perception to what Benjamin’s immanent critical approach had in 
mind. 
The role technology plays in Benjamin's work is ambiguous, but is made 
manifest in within recurring themes of interest throughout his writings. Most directly 
it makes itself manifest in the themes of mechanical reproduction and the related 
issues of politics and aesthetics. It also plays a crucial role in that it influences the 
transformation of experience that happens as a consequence of the advent of 
modernity. In this transformation, technology merges with high capitalism, and 
through this process creates a loss of meaningful experience. The loss is felt at the 
workplace, in the mode of communication, and in the breakdown of community. This 
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phenomenon is a recurring theme throughout Benjamin's work, and is often discussed 
under the theme of 'shock'. Man is no longer completely able to cope with and 
integrate the changes in reality brought forth by technical innovation. Technology 
becomes a source of defensive numbing of the sensorium. Further, technology is also 
potentially able to create new and redeeming forms of experience that enables the 
alienated subject to cope with this upheaval. In Benjamin's way of describing modern 
man's coping with his reality, technology is seen as either as an instrument of 
destruction of traditional experience or a creator of new possible futures. In dwelling 
on these themes, Benjamin is clarifying a main phenomenon that is essential for the 
understanding of his critique of modern urban culture, and technology in particular; 
the decay of aura. When endowed with aura, objects have an almost fetishist quality, 
enabling them to contain a mystifying authority. These qualities make aura an aspect 
of experience that comes to function as the cultural legitimation of traditional social 
functions. Technology is a force that for Benjamin can destroy this link between 
humanity and tradition, rendering it difficult for the mythological and disempowering 
dimensions of social and historical heritage to reproduce within the new situation. 
This technological force leads to the decay of aura, emptying the object of its layers of 
meaning and connotations. Benjamin describes the process of informing the decay of 
aura in terms of a local detachment of the reproduced object from the domain of 
tradition, one which is an aspect of a broader 'shattering of tradition '.73 
Benjamin emphasizes the invention of new technologies in the 19th century as 
the penultimate reason for the restructuring and upheaval of experience that modern 
man is witness to. The 19th century's industrial revolution brought with it a speed of 
production where machines accelerated the very tempo of life.74 The human body, 
through its limitations can only work a restricted number of tools simultaneously. 
Through the evolution of machines after the industrial revolution, the mechanization 
of labor had no such limitation. Where before man and his accumulated experience 
with his tools worked in a uniform production movement. The speed at which the 
machines function in production throws this way of working of kilter, and it becomes 
a disturbance in a world where machines produce machines. Thus, capitalist use of 
production technology induces a new type of communication and a new rhythm of 
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life. Instead of being marked by natural rhythms of work and rest, modern life 
becomes marked by the eventual elimination of all discontinuation, of any sudden 
end. Production in a mechanized technological framework means continuity, 
production around the clock, accelerating traffic, continuous flow of information. 
Through the transformation of life's pace and the way technology is implemented in a 
capitalist framework, humanity has not been able to integrate this new situation in 
adequate ways. In short, the technological organization of modern life has created a 
situation where the interfaces between the mechanical and the organic, between 
inanimate and animate nature has blended to such a degree that it is no longer 
meaningful to speak of them dualistically. Mankind's lack of recognition of this 
transformation leads ultimately to the downfall of the power structures of modernity. 
Without recognizing it, the way man and technology is already intertwined leads to a 
"slave revolt of technology". Technology has developed explosively in modernity 
with the elemental power of a "second nature". Building on the concept of Lukács 
concept of nature, this notion of a "first" and "second nature" is in itself the 
foundation from which we can build an understanding of what Benjamin's definition 
of technology is, and this theme will be discussed in more detail later. Benjamin 
argues that Nature is closed up in the hard shell of what is called "Nature", and new 
"barbaric" acts will be rendered necessary to crack its shell.  
In reading such texts as One Way Street or the Artwork Essay, an attempt to 
re-imagine the aesthetic dimension in reality emerges - in response to the changed 
sensorium of a technologically transformed experience of culture. He tries to reassess, 
redefine and redeem the conditions of experience, affectivity, memory and the 
imagination.75 The 'shock' of the encounter with a technologically changed reality to 
the sensorium is seen as irreversible. There will be no restoration of the instinctual 
power of the senses and a re-emergence of a collective ecstatic communion with 
Cosmos without recognizing that technology has already become an ingrained aspect 
of the human’s subjectivity. Reading his final lines in To the Planetarium, we are not 
given the alternative of distilling a purely non-technological solution to the problems 
facing humanity with the advent of machines. Preventing a technological 
Armageddon implies using technology, and recognizing this, Benjamin acknowledges 
the irreversibility of the historical process. He thus proclaims a collective 
                                                          
75
   Miriam B. Hansen: Benjamin and Cinema, Not a One-Way Street,  p. 235 
  
 
 
32 
innervation76 of technology, instead of hoping for a return to an edenic pre-modern, 
instinctually intact, "natural" state. Instead of plain rejection of the way technology is 
used in the hands of imperialist and capitalist interest, to subdue and master Mother 
Nature, he sketches an alternative. 
Benjamin’s diagnosis of mechanical reproducibility is rather optimistic, in 
relation to its use in enlightening the masses. How? Media products’ functionalization 
could enlighten the masses. In view of the loss of experience in the "age of 
information", norms are purged of meaning, and time has become empty and purely 
homogenous. As a response, Benjamin emphasized the importance of discontinuity 
and heterogeneity. These notions were important in order to preserve or revive the 
revolutionary dynamic inherent in the modern world, with its irreversible progressive 
character. Therefore, the notion of Barbarism and the destructive character involved 
in historical progress was viewed by him as necessities, and potentially liberating as 
well. The naive belief in progress is negated by mobilization of historical 
consciousness. This consciousness recognizes that trauma and catastrophe is not the 
exception, but instead the norm of history. "The concept of progress is to be grounded 
in catastrophe. That things 'just go on' is the catastrophe. It is not that which is 
approaching, but that which is"77. The dramatization of the present moment, Jetztzeit, 
is done with the belief that discontinuity within the continuous could be enacted as a 
revolutionary occasion. Redeeming is thus done by finding the fissure in the 
catastrophic, ongoing, evolution of history.  
Buck-Morss reads Benjamin more as an accelerating spiral or vortex of 
decline culminating in catastrophe only mended by Messianic intervention of 
revolution. The pivotal elements in this theory are threefold: 
(1). Whether this spiral of decline can be transformed into a liberating and potentially 
revolutionary instance where technology and the human senses can be saved from 
succumbing to capitalist agendas,  
(2) Whether the historical notion of experience and memory can be merged with his 
egalitarian and anti-utopian politics,  
(3) The notion of "Profane Illumination"78 of the surrealists, and how this can be 
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brought up to a more general "bodily collective innervation".79 More specifically 
relevant to our discussion is also how this form of mimetic, bodily innervation is 
related to the suppressed wish of communion with cosmic powers, mentioned in To 
the Planetarium;  
 
...,its hour strikes again and again, and then neither nations nor generations can escape it, as 
was made terribly clear by the last war, which was an attempt at new and unprecedented 
commingling with the cosmic powers80  
 
Benjamin attempts to find a way to utilize this attempt at cosmic "commingling", and 
through ordering the relationship between man and technology.  
 
7. Mimetic Innervation  
This leads us to the concept in Benjamin's attempt to imagine an alternative 
conception of technology. Innervation is closely related to what in the Artwork Essay 
was deemed "optical unconscious", but refers more generally to a neurophysiologic 
process that functions as a mediator between external and internal, mental and 
physical, human and mechanical registers.81  
This breakdown of experience, through the shock-encounters of everyday 
urban life, materialized in such mundane instances as a striking a match, switching on 
a light, the noise of the industrial machine and hustle of the street all have their 
psychic counter parts. The internal and external world revealed correspondences that 
induced reactions in the individual, like "mimetic shock absorbers". Like a smile 
appearing automatically on a passer-by in the city, "in order to ward off contact"82. 
Buck-Morss defines this compensatory response as anaesthetics.83 This reaction, to 
the destruction of traditional experience, and its compensatory effects can be linked to 
another notion to which Benjamin dedicated considerable space in his writings: the 
mimetic character. His interest in the corresponding reactions in the human psyche 
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related to the technological upheaval of modern industrialization connects to his 
deeper theory of mimetic correspondence. In the mimetic character of the human 
consciousness resides a connection to the mimetic force in "things":  
 
We start with "similarity". We then try to obtain clarity about the fact that the resemblances 
we can perceive, for example, in people's faces, in buildings and plant forms, in certain cloud 
formations, in skin diseases, are nothing more than tiny prospects from a cosmos of similarity. 
We can go beyond this and attempt to clarify for ourselves the fact that not only are these 
resemblances imported into things by virtue of chance comparisons on our part, but that all of 
them (...) are the effects of an active mimetic force working expressly inside things."84 
 
This passage reveals how Benjamin saw the mimetic faculty as the capacity to relate 
to the external world through patterns of similarity, affinity, reciprocity and 
interaction. Writing within a tradition of reviving the concept of mimesis, he goes 
beyond the aesthetic per se, and emphasizes a more comprehensive understanding of 
the concept. Beyond a purely aesthetic analysis85, he invokes an understanding of the 
mimetic as a form of practice that reconfigures the concept within it.  
The mimetic faculty in human beings responds to natural patterns of similarity 
and correspondence. This refers to the "capacity to recognize and produce such 
correspondences in return"86. These correspondences”transcends the traditional 
subject-object dichotomy and it’s technologically exacerbated splitting of experience 
and agency"87; a development we will look at in more detail in relation to discussions 
on reproductive technologies. The mimetic means "producing similitude". It can be 
viewed as being both a process, activity, action, and functioning as ritual, 
performance and play. Miriam Hansen defines it as "a mode of cognition involving 
sensuous, somatic, and tactile forms of perception; a non-coercive  engagement with 
the other that opens the self to experience, but also, in a darker vein, a rudiment of the 
formerly powerful compulsion to become and behave like something else".88 Mimetic 
cognitive skills have changed over time, "and the gift of producing similarities" have 
changed with historical development. Mimesis was a component of the "ancient 
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magical correspondences and analogies".89 The practice whereby the expressive 
element in objects was brought to speech, human language was itself mimetic and 
magical in origin. In On the Mimetic Faculty, we find a key to how a new relationship 
to technology can be envisaged. It rests in the idea of decay inherent the mimetic 
faculty, where in "the perceptual world of modern man contains only minimal 
residues of the magical correspondences and analogies that were familiar to ancient 
peoples." Benjamin intends to show that modern man is given a choice as to be 
"concerned with the decay of this faculty, or with its transformation." 90 Through an 
alternative utilization of technology, such a transformation is possible.  
I will attempt to show that one such transformation of the mimetic faculty can 
occur through the encounter and response to a technologically altered reality. Through 
the notion of the “mimetic faculty, and by articulating the increased importance of 
experience as Erlebnis in the modern age, Benjamin develops an aspect of embodied 
interaction with nature that stands in opposition to the conventional, means-and-ends 
dominated view of technology. Benjamin's interest and emphasis on the mimetic can 
therefore be seen as motivated by the possibility of a resurgence of the mimetic 
potential residing within the modern, alienated and disenchanted world. 
The mimetic reflex is a defensive reaction to any technological encounter. As 
Buck-Morss states: "The dialectical reversal, whereby aesthetic reception changes 
from a cognitive mode of being "in touch" with reality into a way of blocking out 
reality, destroys the human organism's power to respond politically, even when self-
preservation is at stake."91  The industrialized labor of 19th and early 20th century 
created a mode of reaction that "injures every one of the human senses, paralyzing the 
imagination of the worker." In this way, the individual is "sealed off from 
experience". Information never enters memory, but instead initiates automated 
response, and being overwhelmed by the sensory stimuli of fragmentary impressions, 
"the protective eye sees much - and registers nothing92. Sealed off from experience, 
the human sensory system is forced to parry technological stimuli to shield both body 
and psyche from trauma and perceptual shock. This results in a form of reversal of the 
role of the senses. From functioning as a boundary and a mediator, the human sensory 
system instead takes on the role of shield. Its function is one of numbing, and 
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repression of memory. The synaesthetic system has become one of anaesthetics.93 
Modern life is imbued with the feeling of numbness as a response to the 
corresponding overload of sensory information. Thus, the mimetic nature of the 
nervous system is now characterized as the organizing agent of numbness. Instead of 
being "in touch" with the world, the human sensory experience is characterized by 
blocking it out. This over stimulation and numbness within the mimetic capacity of 
the human sensorium is a direct consequence of the new technological reality.  
In this reality, Benjamin sees a new techno-nature that is both the cause and 
the source of the mimetic capacity's reawakening. The mimetic interaction with the 
environment will be a main area of inquiry in this paper, as it relates to the way the 
altered human sensorium interacts with technology through the process defined as 
innervation.  
 
8. War and remembrance 
The First World War plays a central role in Walter Benjamin's later work. Imperialist 
war, in its highly technological form reverberates many of his writings. In numerous 
essays and reviews he refers to the omnipresence of destruction in the wake of the 
Great War, and prophesized the coming of even greater technological destruction. The 
wars of the future would make the horrors of WWI pale in comparison as the use of 
technological warfare would eventually create destruction of unimaginable scope.94 
Thus, modernity, in its nature would eventually become a state of "hell". Technology 
takes on its destructive, life-consuming aspect in the state of war for Benjamin. 
Technology creates the accumulated productive potential in the latter part of the 19th 
century, which ultimately also increases the potential for destruction. His commentary 
on military technology is also the point of departure for his theory of technology in 
general. One commentator expressed the impact of this war on Benjamin's thought 
thus; ”It is the first world war which provides the traumatic background to Benjamin's 
culture theory, fascism its ultimate context."95 In particular, this conflict had definite 
influence on his thoughts on themes like experience and remembrance. These themes 
proved central to his overall project of creating an immanent critique of modernism, 
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and technology in particular. A passage from the 1936 essay "The Storyteller" sheds 
light on how this war redefined Benjamin's perception of modern life after WWI: 
 
...Experience has fallen in value. And it looks as if it may fall into bottomlessness. (...) that our 
image not only of the external world, but also of the moral world has undergone changes over 
night, changes that were previously thought impossible. Beginning with the First World War, 
a process became apparent which continues to this day. Wasn't it noticeable at the end of the 
war that men who returned from the battlefield had grown silent - not richer but poorer in 
communicable experience? (…)A generation that had gone to school on horse-drawn 
streetcars now stood under the open sky in a landscape where nothing remained unchanged 
but the clouds and, beneath those clouds, in a force field of destructive torrents and 
explosions, the tiny fragile human body.96 
 
I choose to quote this passage at length as it contains keys of vital importance to 
understanding the background for most of Benjamin's later work. This emphasis on 
the radical upheaval of the First World War remained a source of most of his 
emphasis on the transformation of experience, modernity, technology and his 
preoccupation with remembrance and historic materialism. Benjamin refers to the 
lack of communicable experience of the war veterans to show that much of a sense of 
experience as tradition has been totally devalued in the experience of the generation 
of 1914-18 which underwent one of the most monstrous experiences of world history.  
The crisis of modern experience was for Benjamin closely linked with how the 
technological progress fundamentally changed post-industrial Europe. This was for 
him a turning point in the history of humanity, and through this undermined the 
continuity of tradition and with it traditional experience. Traditional experience for 
Benjamin was the integrated, narrative meaningful variety (Erfahrung). In opposition 
to this notion of experience, the concept of Erlebnis signifies a discontinuous, 
fragmented experience which was a consequence of the radical upheaval brought 
forth by the First World War, and its aftermath. Modern experience is permeated by a 
rationally, fact-oriented communication, which leaves vital aspects of reality mute. In 
its wake, the modern mindset emphasizes information in favor of narration. This 
means that there is less room for the storyteller, and the story, which by its nature is 
told and re-told again and again. In "The Storyteller" Benjamin reminds us of the lost 
art of genuine storytelling which was not simply a function of voice, but needed "that 
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old coordination of the soul, the eye and the hand"97 With the advent of the age of 
information, the shock of the isolated fact excludes the re-creation of a multi-faceted 
chain of events which dominates the story. Instead, the fact defies transmission over 
time since its existence is independent of a narrator. 98 The realm of words and spoken 
speech is impoverished than the realm of immediacy and the recognition from which 
it emerged. Erlebnis is a way for Benjamin to describe the state of being that modern 
man is left with as a consequence of the loss of meaning induced by the constant 
shocks of modern life, and technological warfare in particular. Technology brings 
forth a central problem for Benjamin: How to transform this shattering of traditional 
experience, and through it harness its inherent potential for liberating the masses from 
the domination of capitalism and create a new, classless society? 
To grasp technological progress' importance for Benjamin it is necessary to 
dwell deeper into the time and circumstance into which he developed his theory. The 
impact of the First World War marks a watershed in the European intellectualism, and 
from it there evolved conflicting schools of thought in relation to the role, significance 
and impact of this war on European culture. Benjamin's stance in the debate in the 
aftermath of the war was one of advocacy of technological destruction of traditional 
experience, and thus a response to the pressing political situation in which he found 
himself. In danger of over-simplifying the intellectual context into which Benjamin 
wrote, a general outline would imply that he found himself in an intellectual “no-
man’s land”. On one side he rejected the cultural conservatives who in turn rejected 
the technological transformation completely. On the other side of the debate there 
evolved a right-wing aesthetiziation of technology, articulated in the late 1920s and 
early 1930s. In "The work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction", Benjamin 
strongly emphasizes the role of the aesthetiziation of war, and referring to the futurist 
Marinetti's manifesto for war in Ethiopia he defines war as the "rebellion of 
technology". Throughout the essay Benjamin presented the possibility of changes in 
the character of experience leading either to transformation or catastrophe. In the 
epilogue of the essay, he returns to the 'contemporary mass movements' which have 
emerged in response to the epoch of technology. One movement is dedicated to 
transforming all existing structures and identities, while the other attempts to fix the 
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same by investing them with 'ritual values' and 'aura' 
  The epilogue begins by evoking the process which manifests itself in the 
“proletarisation of modern man and the increasing formation of the masses.”99 
Identified as effects of the development of productive forces; these processes embody 
a dynamic movement. Technology creates their momentum. The discrepancy between 
the energy unleashed by technology and the structures available for its use will lead to 
destructive consequences. This is a natural by-product of maladjustment between the 
development of productive forces and the social structures existing within a 
bourgeoisie society. Benjamin argues that this development will culminate in an 
"aestheticisation of politics", which he foresaw at the time of writing the essay in 
1935. The reason for this is twofold: Firstly, Fascism, with its "Führer" cult, creates a 
submission of the masses, and through this submission becomes a work of art, 
viewing mobilization for war as necessary. Why? Benjamin argues that only war can 
function as a goal, and a collective locus of attention, while at the same time 
upholding faith in the traditional property system. Secondly, the production of ritual 
values becomes the sole focus of technology. This 'violation of the technological 
apparatus' for the destructive implementation of war is the only way to utilize the 
entire specter of technological resources while at the same time relying on the 
property system. These two violations of the technological are fused into a view of 
technology as 'rebelling' against society:  
 
If the natural utilization of productive forces is impeded by the property system, the increase 
in technical devices, in speed, and in the sources of energy will press for an unnatural 
utilization, and this is found in war. (…) Imperialistic war is a rebellion of technology which 
collects, in the form of 'human material', the claims to which society has denied its natural 
material.100  
 
The conditions for a balance between technology and its social organization have yet 
to be discovered, although Benjamin hints in this passage, this will require a mutual 
adaptation of technology and social organization to which no structure or law will be 
expected. In The Work of Art essay, Benjamin explains this technological "rebellion" 
as a symptom a more comprehensive phenomenon: "the tremendous shattering of 
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tradition which is the obverse of the contemporary crisis and renewal of humanity."101 
While not defining technological change as the sole reason for this 
'shattering'102, his intention was to draw attention to the manner in which human 
perception is dependent on a mode of experience that is not solely a product of nature 
but also socio-historical changes. On the same note he explains: "Just as the entire 
mode of existence of human collectives changes over long historical periods, so too 
does their mode of perception. The way in which human perception is organized - the 
medium in which it occurs - is conditioned not only by nature but by history."103 What 
happens as a consequence of the historical occurrence of a breakdown of tradition, 
and with it it's mode of perception? Benjamin would argue that at the core of this 
transformation lays the experience of the “planetary extension of technology”, which 
is transforming the collective and individual human "Physis" and with it the character 
of human experience.104 With the transformation of experience the opposition 
between form and content, based fundamentally on the Kantian opposition of subject 
and object, is no longer justifiable. The extension of the concept of experience into the 
realm of the technological implies that both the body and Physis of human beings and 
nature are permeated by technological organization. This ongoing process leads to a 
suspension of the boundaries of the natural body. This is a development that has far 
reaching consequences both on an individual, human and planetary scale. The 
separation between man and machine, nature and culture is no longer clearly 
designated. There is no longer any place beyond technological organization of the 
body from which to impose form upon content, since both form and content already 
have become technically organized.  
Should we interpret Benjamin's view of war as a 'rebellion of technology' as a 
rhetorical statement, formulated as a critique of capitalism or does the paragraph hint 
at something more fundamental in his thinking? In looking at the context in which 
Benjamin wrote his polemics against the war, and the role of technology in particular, 
we can approach this question in a more precise manner. 
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9. War and Warrior; Benjamin’s response to Ernst Jünger  
In order to contextualize Benjamin’s theory of technology, it is important to compare 
and connect his thinking with those theories of technology that developed around him.  
With the zeitgeist of the 20s and 30s wartime literature, the most prominent figure 
may have been Ernst Jünger. While not the only writer Benjamin had in mind105, 
Jünger’s work was an important point of departure for his critique of contemporary 
theories that uncritically heralded the use of technology as unconditional enrichment 
of human existence. It is beyond the scope of my paper to consider the modernist 
“conservatives” among Benjamin’s contemporaries. However, Jünger exemplifies 
what I could say was symptomatic for the intellectual currents that Benjamin often 
strongly opposed. Ernst Jünger, who also proved an important influence on Martin 
Heidegger's thought, were both consistent with what could be named a "conservative 
revolution". The essential aspect of this movement was recognition of the fact that 
underneath the socio-economic structures permeating modern society, there resided a 
more fundamental yet subtle influence on modernity transcending the causal-material 
realm. Influenced by Nietzsche, Jünger saw technological progress as manifestations 
of the eternal Will to Power. Man was but an instrument in the emancipation in this 
very latest phase of Will to Power. Therefore, technology is nothing essentially 
mechanical, but merely a facet of this eternal will. Viewing technology not as a 
consequence of rational forces, but more of an aesthetic phenomenon, as a 
technological sublime, the realm of the technical becomes a realm manifesting the 
possibility of transcending "good and evil", as a natural, a-moral force in itself. Sosio-
economic realities became mere signs of a deeper and eternal play of mythical forces, 
supernatural and irrational powers. As other reactionary writers of his time, Jünger 
saw that modernity, and industrial technology in particular could not be seen either in 
terms of liberal free-market economy or Marxist economic theories. Rather, it needed 
this deeper or more meta-physical dimension to grasp the subtle transformations of 
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thought permeating the sudden and drastic transformations occurring through 
industrial and technological progress. 
  In many aspects of his theory of technology, Benjamin is building a response 
to the right-wing aestheticisation of technology. Jünger, unlike the conservatives of 
his time who in the aftermath of WWI railed against technological development, 
embraced the destruction of the past through technological development. This would 
pave the way for a new and better mode of existence. In his view, technology has 
become the ontology of modernity. Anticipating a coming of the age of the Machine, 
he envisioned a future where man and machine would be merged, creating a new, 
synthesis of technology and humanity. His writings on WWI are dominated by the 
aestheticisation of destruction and glorification of war. Within the moment of battle, 
there emerged a fusion of technology and existential danger that heralded a new, 
heroic master warrior. His books are marked by a tendency to create symbolic images 
of a synthesis of nature and machine. Titles such as “Storms of Steel” and 
“Hurricanes of Fire” reflect a use of metaphor that reveals a view of nature as a 
Physis in need of mastery. Nature is objectified, and in being thus needs to be 
subverted. As a response to this way of dichotomizing nature and man, Benjamin 
attempted to develop a theory in response to Jünger where a reconstitution of a 
harmonious relationship between technology and nature is emphasized.106 As a 
celebration of the incursion of technology into modern life, Jünger also develops the 
theme of 'danger', as characteristic for the modern urban experience. Through the 
technological transformation of reality, Man is seen as a new and potentially 
transformed subject: armored, like a fascist type of cyborg, impervious to pain. The 
use of technologically induced protection, man can face the death, destruction and 
horror of war, and through this experience come to terms with his own existence.107  
More importantly, lived experience is allowed to become abstracted into aesthetic 
experience through technology. Jünger's aesthetics thus becomes aesthetics of and 
through technology.  
In order to grasp this notion of aesthetical experience, it is necessary to look 
more closely into his idea of a secondary, technologically induced nature. Through his 
writings, Jünger argues that technology transforms the subjects perception of reality in 
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such a way that it becomes abstracted, and allows for an objectification of reality. 
This is possible due to new technologies ability to protect the human subject. It 
provides an amour that allows the subject to stand in a new, objective relation to the 
state of affairs, outside the realm of sensation. In this way, the technological armor 
induces a new possibility for critical analysis, aloof from the suffering and fear of an 
exposed human subject. The technological protection creates a new possibility for a 
functional adaptation to the dangers of the modern world. This detachment opens up 
possibilities for a development of a fusion of technology and Man in the technological 
warrior. This new way of looking at a synthesis of Man and machine reveals itself 
most clearly in the way Jünger envisages a reconstitution of vision. The sense of 
vision is seen as a mode of attack, and materializes in the camera, making 
photography a new type of weapon.108 The mechanical eye of a camera makes for a 
displacement of experience, through freezing the moment in time, and through this 
process registering the moment in consciousness. In this way, the experience of 
trauma in war is evaded because conscious perception of the moment is felt through 
the camera before the real emotional impact of the trauma is felt.109. Accordingly, the 
machine creates a displacement of experience, making technology the shield or 
amour, protecting the individual from traumatization.  
Subjective experience occurs for Jünger in a different constitutive frame, when 
technologically mediated. The shocks of modernity are defended against by the 
technology that simultaneously allows for enhancement of perception. In this way, 
technology is creating a new, abstracted mode of experience that neglects or negates 
the experience of pain. Emotional defense is also technological defense.  
Benjamin found himself in a political situation in which a theory of 
technological destruction was the response. Jünger and other romantics of war 
believed technology to having a telos110 that rendered the right wing politics 
victorious. Having this political agenda in mind, Benjamin argued differently. 
Technology for him unfolded towards a non-instrumental telos. In 1930 Benjamin 
reviewed the collection of essays titled "War and Warrior" edited by Ernst Jünger. 
Here, he identified several problematic issues. The way technology was couched in 
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mythical terms and the aesthetic rendering of technological change was for Benjamin 
a symptom of an idealistically perceived view of nature. The mystery of nature was 
solved by "a mystical use of technology, rather than using and illuminating the secrets 
of nature via the detour and organization of human affairs."111  Despite the effort of 
Jünger and the other contributors to recapture the alleged communal solidarity of their 
fronterlebnins, Benjamin recognized that the technologically manufactured slaughter 
of the front was anything but an 'inner experience' worth re-enacting in peacetime. In 
his review he ferociously denounced the aestheticization of violence and glorification 
of the 'fascist class warrior' he saw lurking being the new cult of 'eternal war'. Where 
Jünger saw beauty, Benjamin saw slaughter and carnage. Indeed, according to 
Benjamin, the notion of heroism is not enhanced in this First World War, but instead 
overrun by pure technological warfare's characteristics. This is exemplified by the 
lack of distinction between civilian and military causalities in gas attacks, rendering 
international law useless. The war is a cultic war, mythological in nature, recreated to 
fit idealism where nature and man stands in opposition. In this project Benjamin sees 
the role of technology as a mediator of a recreated German idealism. Through this 
idealism Benjamin sees Jünger and his colleagues as using technology to solve the 
mystery of an idealistically perceived nature. In opposition to the fascist conception of 
Nature, Benjamin defines Nature as something humans should order their relationship 
to one another in accordance with. And the ordering principle through which 
relationship is maintained should be technology.112 
In this review, Benjamin offers us a view of technology as a force in itself, 
independent of how it is utilized. In short, the way technology has been used within a 
capitalist framework has created a discrepancy between how technology is 
implemented and the potential for social and cultural change it contains. 
Technological progress under a capitalist and bourgeoisie paradigm creates a 
recurring problem; modern society was in its beginning overwhelmed by the potential 
of technology. At the start of his review, Benjamin, quoting Leon Daudet in Action 
Franςaise, equates technology itself with the condition of war:  
 
"L'automobile c'est la guerre". This surprising association of ideas was based on the 
perception of an increase in technical artifacts, in power sources, and in tempo generally that 
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the private sector can neither absorb completely, nor utilize adequately but that nonetheless 
demands vindication. But vindication can only occur in antithesis to a harmonious balance, in 
war, and the destructive power of war provides clear evidence that social reality was not ready 
to make technology its own organ, and that technology was not strong enough to master the 
elemental forces of society.113 
 
Deeming the way society is coping with the overwhelming power of technological 
innovation, one of the underlying reasons for war is the 'slave revolt of technology'. 
What this means is that Benjamin sees the most disastrous aspects of war are partly 
consequences of "the gaping discrepancy" of the power of technology, and the lack of 
wisdom in its use. He points to the way bourgeois society takes technology solely into 
instrumental use, and for its own profit: 
 
Indeed, according to its economic nature, bourgeois society cannot help but insulate 
everything technological as much as possible from the so-called spiritual, and it cannot help 
but resolutely exclude technology's right of co-determination in the social order. Any future 
war will also be a slave revolt of technology.114 
 
In short, the response that Benjamin gives to the new reactionary voices of fascist 
technological idealization reveals several ongoing areas of concern. These themes are 
rooted in the cultural and political context of the post-war Weimar republic, but would 
prove to mould his theory of technology to such an extent that they are emblematic to 
it. They manifest themselves in what can be seen as his précis for his entire 
philosophy, To the Planetarium. 
 
10. Communion with a New Nature 
When attempting to wrest a coherent argument from Benjamin’s texts on war and 
technology, one text remains almost axiomatic in relation to his later texts on these 
subjects. As a grand finale of One Way Street, To the Planetarium (Zum Planetarium) 
has by some scholars been seen as the synopsis of his entire philosophy.115 When 
read, the text cannot but come across as ambiguous. With this text, published in 1928, 
Benjamin attempts to encapsulate all of history, but as Irving Wohlfarth points out, “a 
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life’s work is certainly contained within it.”116 
In "To the Planetarium" Benjamin speaks of Technology as a new Physis of 
body for both humanity and nature. Benjamin did not use the term "New Physis" 
because he meant by it not just industrial technology, but the entire world of matter, 
among them man, as being transformed by that technology. The subordination of 
technology to obsolete forms of identity (such as 'nations and families’ along with 
private property and the pursuit of profit) leads to the 'revolt of technology'. This 
happens as a consequence of technology being forced into unnatural paths by the 
agendas of bourgeois-capitalist interest. The post-war communist revolutions are 
described as the first attempt by humanity to bring this new 'body' under control.  
This short piece, concluding the "One Way Street" text indicates how 
Benjamin envisaged the relationship between nature and technology. In short, 
mankind's ability to relate to the cosmos has gone from the ecstatic and collective, to 
the detached and private. In antiquity this relationship was one of communion, 
whereas modern man has lost this immediacy. "...the knowledge of what is nearest to 
us and what is remotest to us, and never of one without the other."117 In modern times, 
our relationship to the cosmos is one where the optical sense is of most importance. 
The sciences, like modern astronomy, define our experience through the telescopes. 
Modern man's relationship to the stars is thus typified. Instead, Benjamin states that 
this relationship should be one of both distance and a sense of closeness. By contrast, 
the destruction of aura, brought on by technology abolishes any sense of distance.118 
To be both distant and close in this context would imply that the more tactile and 
concrete forms of the ancients, fused the more abstract states of relating to the cosmos 
through modern technology. The central point for Benjamin is that when the optical 
sense gains a more prominent role, a more holistic and integrated experience is 
sacrificed. Yet, if the ancient’s practice of communion and being was maintained, this 
would not necessarily lead to the one-sided emphasis on the visual or the optic. The 
way this could be done is by maintaining them through resonating sufficiently with 
the modern technologies.    
Through technological destruction of traditional experience, this relationship 
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is dominated by a need for mastery, instead of communion. I read the below as a key 
passage in understanding Benjamin's later writings, and what kind of "second nature" 
technology manifests. He underlines the danger of modern man to label ancient ways 
of relating to nature and the cosmos as unimportant, reduced to an individual poetic 
experience:  
 
It is not. It's hour strikes again and again, and then neither nations nor generations can escape 
it, as was terribly clear by the last war, which was an attempt at new and unprecedented 
commingling with the cosmic powers. Human multitudes, gases, electrical forces were 
hurdled into the open country, high-frequency currents coursed through the landscape, new 
constellations rose in the sky, aerial space and ocean depths thundered with propellers, and 
everywhere sacrificial shafts were dug into mother earth. This immense wooing of the cosmos 
was enacted for the first time on a planetary scale that is in the spirit of technology.119 
 
This passage signifies what Benjamin saw as a direct consequence of the rejection of 
human cosmic consciousness. He warns us not to disregard our prior relationship to 
the cosmos, since it will return in a potential destructive way, in the form of 
technologically engendered destruction on a massive scale, like the First World War. 
It is important to mark that Benjamin's line of reasoning about the fate of techno-
warfare has clear affinities towards orthodox communism. The argument of the text 
can be reduced to the relation between new forces of production, that blast open old 
relations of production. During the diverting of this force from its original goal, the 
dammed up production forces find unwholesome reactionary paths of expression, 
resulting in imperialist warfare.120 With war Benjamin sees the vain "attempt of a new 
and unprecedented commingling with the cosmos".121 Instead of following this path 
towards destruction, Benjamin envisioned a revolution where the proletariat takes 
over as the master of the productive forces. In this prospect, the Messianic aspect, 
fused unconventionally with the Marxist influence of his writings is of central 
importance. A theme which dominated his thought in the 20s and 30s and a theme 
which manifests itself within the closing lines of the text, when stating the way 
revolution would redeem, and resuscitate the corrupted new “body” of technology: 
“The power of the proletariat is the measure of its convalescence”.122  The uprisings 
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in the aftermath of WWI may have failed, but something was gained still. Within the 
countermovement, the slave revolt of technology was wrestled from the imperialists, 
showing the potential for a liberated future. Technology could be used for creating a 
better life for the masses, rather than forcing them to submission under the productive 
forces of capitalism. 
Drawing on such influences as Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Freud in 
particular, this text gives a grim diagnosis of the First World War as a symptom of 
European nihilism.123 The reality of war permeates the text, and reveals what radical 
upheaval the massive technological destruction leaves in its wake. The capacity for 
total and mutual annihilation exhibits the power of technology to end all wars, but at 
the same time to end all life. Only through channeling this power down constructive 
paths can this end be averted. These polarities, destruction and creative, revolutionary 
overcoming have clear Freudian connotations; “Living substance conquers the frenzy 
of destruction only in the ecstasy of procreation”124. The “death-drive” is seen by 
Freud to be standing in mutual conflict and dependence of the “sex-drive”, or rather 
“Thanatos” and “Eros”. Wohlfarth has pointed out that in “Unbehagen in der Kultur”, 
and indirectly in To the Planetarium, the world is a stage for the eternal battle of Eros 
and Thanatos.125 In Benjamin’s case, the concluding sentence quoted above reveals 
not only a affirmation of the creation of life over destruction, but also a “conquering” 
that entails affirmative action that counters and overcomes destruction in a moment of 
“ecstasy” (Rauch). Thus, not only does Benjamin fuse the Nietzshean will to power 
with Freud, but also the revolutionary power of Marxism is combined with the hope 
for a Messianistic moment of redemption. The text starts as follows:  
 
If one had to expound the teachings of antiquity with the utmost brevity while standing on one 
leg, as did Hillel that of the Jews, it could only be in this sentence:”They alone shall possess 
the earth who live from the powers of the cosmos.126  
 
As such the opening and the ending sentences of the text induce Messianic 
perspectives in juxtaposition with the eternal battle of Thanatos and Eros.127 In 
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denying the aspects of human consciousness that seeks communion with what is 
larger than man, Benjamin foresaw that these impulses will return, in a perverted 
state, which within modernity results in total war. As such, Benjamin can here be seen 
as attempting to wrest the creative potential in the perverted state of war and channel 
into the Eros of creative potential. But how does Benjamin envisage this return to a 
collective communion, after the neglected impulses of mankind is saved from running 
towards destruction. And in what way can the ancient cosmic interaction be found 
within a technological life world? One way is for Benjamin to try to savor traces of 
the old within the new: In being both distant and close, the ancient’s concrete and 
direct way of being would bind the modern abstract modes of relating with the 
cosmos through modern technological means.  
Throughout Benjamin's work, the potential of savoring the prior modes of 
being within the modern, so that these were maintained through and alongside the 
technological modes were stressed. When technology instead is used as the instrument 
to 'enact the cosmic experience', as proclaimed by Jünger (and Marinetti), experience 
of the cosmos withdraws, and instead becomes lost in instrumental ends. The mastery 
of nature through technology is for Benjamin a sidetrack, leading to disastrous results. 
Modern man has a narrow and limited concept of nature, and its extension is grossly 
limited to that of the genuine cosmic experience. This new 'Physis' that technology 
has become entails a new way of relating to nature. It need not be an instrument of 
power and submission. Instead, there resides endless potential within these new forms 
to re-establish a contact with the cosmos and 'bring this new body under control'. 
Benjamin implies that through a balanced and integrated use, technology will 
not attempt to master nature, but instead try to master the relation between man and 
nature. At stake is the regulating function that technology entails when facing the 
relationship between man, as producers, and nature: 
 
Mastery of nature, so the imperialists teach us, is the purpose of all technology. But who 
would trust a martinet that declared that the control of children by adults is the purpose of 
education? Is not the education above all the indispensable regulation of the relationship 
between generations and therefore mastery, if we are to use this term, of that relationship and 
not that of children? And likewise technology is not the mastery of nature but of the relation 
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between nature and humanity.128 
 
This emphasis on regulation, as a two-way process permeates Benjamin's work as he 
attempts to sketch out alternative ways of harnessing technology's potential. Rather 
than imposing control over nature itself, the interrelations of man and nature are to be 
regulated. To the Planetarium indicates a profound transformation in the way humans 
perceive and relate to the object world. This transformation was actualized by social 
change, and realized and made a necessity by technological development. Through it, 
the proletariat, as the revolutionary subject can regain control over the productive 
forces. Thus the concluding sentence of the text may be interpreted as referring to the 
uprisings in the wake of WWI, and finally culminating with the Russian Revolution in 
1917. The power wrested from the technological destruction of the war was 
momentarily taken out of the hands of the imperialists, and harnesses as medium for 
freedom for the collective. But is this all that is contained within this enigmatic text?  
The city is increasingly the technological site of human habitation. The site 
where the collision of technology and human tradition is most marked. It is also here 
that the misuses of technological progress come most visible. The misuses of 
technology have two major reasons according to Benjamin: Firstly, the distorted use 
of technology under capitalism, which mainly serves the ruling class. Secondly, the 
way technology maintains the perverted relation to nature, which means the way 
technology is implemented. Instead of letting man give himself over to cosmic 
communion, technology is used as a tool of mastery. In fact, the structures of modern 
civilization entail on a fundamental level a basic intention of submission of nature, 
and often a violent one. This is evident not only in engineering and through weapons 
of mass destruction, but as a way of being. Nature is endowed with characteristics 
which reveal the mythological mode of thinking. As such, instead of purging reality 
of myth, the idea of mastery exhibits a mythological thinking originating in the 
collective unconscious. In 'conquering' and 'harnessing' the forces of nature, an 
underlying conceptual worldview is revealed. A view submerged in myth. Citing 
Simmel, Benjamin points the finger at a terminology that exhibits rationality and 
sober empirical foundations, but discloses it's direct opposite: 
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On the bungled reception of technology: ’The illusions in this sphere are reflected quite 
clearly in the terminology that is used in it, and in which a mode of thinking, proud of 
its...freedom from myth, discloses the direct opposite of these features. To think that we 
conquer or control nature is a very childish supposition, since ...all notions of... conquest and 
subjugation have a proper meaning only of an opposing will has been broken.(...)it does show 
that the mythological mode of thought is also at home within the scientific world view'129 
 
Domination of nature becomes paradigmatic to the modern consciousness. In relating 
to nature, modern man is creating a relationship of means and ends, where direct 
experience of the non-human has no place as valuable in-itself. The result is that 
"technology has betrayed humankind and transformed the bridal bed to a bloodbath". 
Instead, a more integrating use of technology would be to master the relationship of 
man and nature. How this 'authentic' experience of cosmos could be recreated implies 
a relationship between man, technology and nature not based on domination. This 
relationship is dependent on Benjamin's concept of aura, and the discontinuation of 
the belief in progress. 
 
11. Progress:  A One Way Street 
Paradigmatic to Benjamin’s theory of technology is the fundamental critique he 
launches on the faith in progress. Modernity is by and large a consequence of the 
chain of success that followed from the age of enlightenment and it's freeing of the 
sciences from the fetters of tradition and religion. Within Benjamin's writings resides 
a basic and essential mistrust in modern man’s tenuous belief in 'progress', and also 
that progress is coincidental with improving the quality of life for mankind per se. 
One Way Street presents the anti-bourgeoisie revolution as a counter-force to the 
technological and economical development leading up to the First World War, and 
signified a shattering of a legacy of thousands of years. Irving Wohlfarth argues that 
Benjamin conceived revolution as accelerating the dialectic of historical progress and 
as pulling its emergency cord130, vaguely insinuating revolutions as the crucial point 
in human history where the winds of progress are silenced. 
To further grasp Benjamin's theory of technology we need to look closer into 
this basic critique of the mythological character that technological development is 
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granted within modernity; based on the idea that technology is itself able to improve 
the human social and moral condition. In the powers harnessed by technology from 
utilizing the natural resources, modern capitalist society envisages a future of growth 
and prosperity. To the Planetarium shows how a socialist revolution could potentially 
harness the positive aspects of this development. Benjamin remains suspicious 
towards the socialists of his day, who remained keenly focused on following the 
movement of material progress in hope of an emancipated society. Benjamin was 
aware that without a revolutionary interruption of technological progress under 
capitalism, the future of man would be threatened. In spite of the obvious advantages 
within technological progress, Benjamin was keen to point the finger at the various 
ways capitalist industrial 'progress' had produced considerable social 'regression'. 
Modernist urban life was in this respect a site of increasing social unrest and 
inequality; instead of being a medium for creating a technological utopia, it 
manifested the qualities August Strindberg defined as 'hell'.131 The advent of the Third 
Reich and the Second World War would soon provide empirical evidence for this 
profane version of hell, realized with the use new technological tools. 
Throughout One Way Street Benjamin shows how relations to nature and to 
other humans are given limited expression by the commodity form of money, a key 
symptom of which is the subordination of technology to profit. His subsequent work 
on the experience of the city criticizes the relationship between commodification and 
technology, showing how the possibility of a new experience of space and time 
opened up by technology is reduced by the commodity form.132 As a consequence, the 
liberating potential residing within new technological forms is retained within the 
bourgeois interest of controlling technology for profit, and by this maintaining the 
power-structures of mastery, both in relation to the proletariat, and nature. In contrast,  
the authentic experience of the cosmos explicated in To the Planetarium, points 
towards a redefined relationship between man, technology and nature. This 
relationship could only be established through and because of embracing the 
revolutionary powers inherent in technology itself. 
With history being dictated by the ruling class, technology and scientific 
rationality accumulates a self-evident role as truth-references. In the essay Eduard 
Fuchs, Collector and Historian (1937), Benjamin returns to reveal the underlying 
                                                          
131
  W. Benjamin, Central Park, New German Critique, No. 34, p. 50 
132
  H. Caygill, Walter Benjamin, The Colour of Experience, p. 119 
  
 
 
53 
self-evident role of technology and science within modernity: 
 
But technology is not purely a scientific phenomenon. It is also a historical one. As such it 
forces us to investigate the positivist and undialectical separation between the natural sciences 
and the humanities. The questions which mankind asks of nature are determined among other 
things by its level of production. This is the point where positivism breaks down. In the 
development of technology, it saw only the progress of science, not the retrogression of 
society. It overlooked the fact that capitalism has decisively conditioned that development. It 
also escaped the positivists among the theoreticians of Social Democracy that the development 
of technology made it more and more difficult for the proletariat to take possession of it ... 
They failed to perceive the destructive side of technology because they were alienated from 
the destructive side of dialectic.133 
 
By developing the line of reasoning that highlights the link between the apparent self-
evident facticity of science and technology, and its lurking rejection of the obvious 
discrepancies of vision and reality, Benjamin begins his redeeming and revolutionary 
project. In revealing the lack of recognition of the inherent destructive character of 
scientific and technological progress, he believes that society will encounter it's 
alienation by entering into social unrest and upheaval. The collective consciousness 
will re-emerge with a vengeful streak, and modern culture must face it's rejected, and 
defected sides:  
 
This set the trend of the last century; the defective reception of technology. It consisted in a 
series of vigorous and repeated attempts to get around the fact that technology serves this 
society solely for the production of commodities...134 
 
Through the last century's tendencies towards technological romanticism, society was 
totally devoid of any recognition of the actual experience of the development of the 
productive forces. Without this type of knowledge, the consequences of a 
technological development motivated purely by the capitalist interest become 
unchecked: 
 
It is discovering that traffic speeds, like the capacity to duplicate both the spoken and the 
written word, have outstripped human needs. The energies that technology develops beyond 
their threshold are destructive. They serve primarily to foster the technology of warfare, and of 
means used to prepare public opinion for war. It may be said of this development, which was 
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thoroughly class-determined, that it occurred behind the back of the last century-which was 
not yet aware of the destructive energies of technology. 135 
 
Technology in its capitalist utilization makes use of the worker, and factory 
machinery gives this transposition a technically concrete form. Machines arrange 
reality around them in such a way that humans become adjuncts to the machine. 
Industrial labor, through its formation within the 20th and 21st century confirms 
Benjamin’s notion that technology has “assaulted the human body”. In addition, the 
human sensorium had undergone a conditioning in encountering with technology. In 
his entries in the Passagen-werk on Charles Baudelaire, Benjamin extends his 
anthropology of industrialized modernity by introducing the category of shock, and 
also the decline of the aura. Here Benjamin defines the chief sources of the decline of 
aura in the capitalist technologies of mass production: “Mass production is the 
principal cause – and class warfare the principal social cause – of the decline of the 
aura.”136  
Capitalist utilization of technology is based on producing commodities. 
Commodity production depends on the logic of obsolescence, which means that an 
economic system reproduces itself and its products while giving the surface 
impression of producing novelty and paving the way for progress. But the hidden 
reality of this system is its monotonous rhythm of production, which is based on fixed 
structures of productions relations. Benjamin named this capitalist production cycle 
after Nietzsche’s concept of “eternal return”. What is produced and deemed “new” is 
simultaneously marked by the unconscious knowledge that there is nothing new to 
come, due to the fact that the current economic system of production relations remains 
the same. The debilitating nature of eternal return means that “life under the influence 
of eternal return guarantees an existence that does not emerge from the auratic”.137 
This existence, where repetition conceals the bleakness of a capitalist culture 
permeated by alienation, is symptomatic to the decay of the aura. From this vantage 
point, Benjamin seeks to define modernity as dialectically opposite to the ancient 
relationship of cosmic communion. But it is exactly due to this decay or absence of 
the auratic that a renewed collective relationship with the cosmos is possible, through 
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the very technology that has been utilized to suppress the masses. Through technology 
mankind is forced to alter his conditioned perception of reality, which in turn 
transforms his relation to nature. How then does Benjamin envisage this new 
relationship to come about? The answer may be connected with his conception of 
aura, and innervation, or as we will discuss below, two different types of auratic 
experience.  
 
12. Aura, Aesthetics and War 
What then can be said of the way technology changes our perception of reality? 
Taking all the above dimensions of this question into consideration, Benjamin sees 
technological upheaval within modernity as manifesting itself within the role of art. 
Seen as arguably the most influential of his essays The Work of Art in the Epoch of its 
Technical Reproducibility takes up many of the theoretical strands from One Way 
Street. The “tremendous shattering of tradition which is the obverse of the 
contemporary crisis and renewal of humanity”138 brought on by technology can be 
traced back to Zum Planetarium. At its core this radical change signals an experience 
of the global emergence of technology, or the growing synthesis of Techne and Physis 
as such. To paraphrase from To the Planetarium; this change is the transformation of 
the collective and individual Physis and with it the character of human experience.139 
Through technology a new Physis is being born through which a new contact with the 
cosmic forces emerges. As mentioned earlier, one consequence of this transformation 
is that there is no “beyond” the technological. The Physis of man and nature is already 
permeated by the technical; the separation of form and content becomes irrelevant. 
Modernity is marked by this dissolution of these boundaries, and through it the 
dissolution of the traditional concept of art. Benjamin sees this not as a loss but a 
possibility of grounding a new notion of art rooted in the technological. Here 
Benjamin makes a crucial distinction between art as accepting the boundaries and 
limits of the reproductive technologies at a given point in time, and realizing the 
transformative and redemptive potential within these technologies. This vital 
distinction is intimately related to how mankind’s interaction with technology can be 
mimetic and liberating, instead of reactive and alienating. In the essay, this liberating 
potential is closely related to the technologies of photography, mass media and film in 
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particular. Here the text is faithful to the manifest of One Way Street, where 
technology’s role is not one of mastery, but instead of regulating the relationship 
between man and nature. In this light, film’s social function is seen by Benjamin to 
establish equilibrium between man and machine.140 According to his remarks in The 
Work of Art essay, technical reproducibility reverses the social function of the work 
because the work of art no longer finds its uniqueness expressed in ritual. When this 
uniqueness is lost, it corresponds to the loss of what could be deemed the "aura" of 
the artwork. What constitutes this auratic dimension, or rather, what makes this 
concept central to our understanding of the role of technology in Benjamin's work? 
The uniqueness of aura is defined in the essay when the auratic character of a work of 
art is compared to the aura of a natural object. In the latter case, the aura is attributed 
to what Benjamin deems as the”unique appearance of distance"141. When objects have 
aura, they retain a fetishistic quality that generates a sense of authority or reverence. 
Aura comes therefore to legitimize the continuation of traditional social functions, 
together with preserving the status quo of present social structures. As a response to 
the “barbarism” of the rising fascist cult, Benjamin sought to recover a previous form 
of auratic experience not related to art, or objects, but natural objects. The Jüngerian, 
Fascist embrace of “auratic” experience and objects needed to be countered with a 
return to a former collective communal form of auratic experience.  
Relevant to our discussion is the realization that Benjamin brought forth in To the 
Planetarium: Through the ecstatic communion with the cosmos was one of trance 
(Rausch), and only through this altered state of perception can man “gain knowledge 
of what is nearest to us and what is remotes from us, and never the one without the 
other.”142 Thus, there is a genuine trace of auratic experience that needs to be 
redeemed for mankind to have renewed communion with the cosmos. Within the 
technological shattering of tradition, renewal of humanity is dependent on re-
discovering the source of the natural auratic experience. Tradition binds experience to 
set patterns manifested in the aura of an object. Benjamin could be interpreted to 
advocate an abandonment of the older traditional ways of experience, due to their 
auratic character. Because of their close relationship to the system of domination they 
are a part of, and sustains through their existence, these old forms of experience 
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should be discarded to make space for a new and revolutionary way of experience. 
But this is not sufficient for creating a dialectical image of history, as the past is not 
something lost, or set, but (changeable) and source of vital cultural heritage. Much of 
Benjamin's work is pointing to another alternative project, namely that of reclaiming 
forms of experience that is threatened by capitalist modernity and technological 
progress. The shattering of tradition can instead become a necessary and essential 
occurrence in the attempt to reclaim aspects the ancient’s heritage. Benjamin links 
between the aura and redemption, claiming that the decay of aura and the weakened 
ability to envision a better future are one and the same. It is important to note the 
difference he described between the ancient and modern way of experience in One 
Way Street, and how this affected man's view of nature and cosmos. The modern 
world is governed by an instrumentalist and discursive mode of experiencing, in 
contrast with the ancient way, marked not by communicative knowledge, but 
mystical, or even magical communion. But this does not mean that the auratic 
experience is permeated by mystical-religious undercurrents. The auratic for 
Benjamin is much too ambivalent concept to entail such references. Instead his first 
definition of the aura is an experience of natural surroundings: We define the aura as 
the unique appearance [Erscheinung] of a distance, however close it may be. Resting 
on a summer afternoon and letting one's gaze follow a mountain range on the horizon 
or a branch which casts its shadow on one - that means breathing the aura of those 
mountains, that branch"143 The impersonal, yet subjective mode of perception relates 
at it's origin to natural objects, yet since our modes of perceiving the world are 
historically contingent, and dependent on historical change, this mode of perception in 
inherently in change. But the new technologically altered perception of modernity 
could potentially include a positive, original form of aura. In nature, the genuine, 
original auratic experience could be found. 
In the epilogue of the essay, Benjamin again returns to the issue of war, and 
technological destruction. He returns to his contemporary mass movements which 
have emerged in response to the epoch of technology. One such movement is 
dedicated to transforming all existing structures and identities, while the other seeks 
similar ends by different means; investing them with "ritual values" and aura. The 
epilogue starts by describing the process in which "the proletarianisation of modern 
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man and the increasing formation of the masses" is invoked.144 This process gains its 
momentum through the ever increasing influence of technology, and the effects of the 
development of the productive forces. If the social structure does not align itself to 
these productive forces, this misalignment will ultimately tend towards a destructive 
outcome. This outcome or "solution" is defined by Benjamin as manifested in two 
diametrical opposite outcomes, which both include the introduction of aesthetics into 
politics. The first is diagnosed as the "violation of the masses, whom Fascism, with its 
Führer cult, forces to their knees", creating a work of art out of society itself. Society 
is submerged in mass-auratic aesthetic project that culminates in mobilization for war, 
and its own downfall. Benjamin states that only war on a grand scale can set a goal for 
mass movements while at the same time maintaining the traditional property system. 
The second outcome is marked by the violation of a technology that is utilized solely 
for the production of "ritual values". When technology is brought under submission 
by the capitalist framework, the final consequence is again war, as this is "the only 
way to mobilize all of today's technical resources while maintaining the property 
system.145 These two violations or "solutions" are the direct consequence of unnatural 
utilization of technology, whose natural utilization is impeded by the capitalist 
property system. The unnatural utilization will culminate in war: 
 
The destructiveness of war furnishes proof that society has not been mature enough to 
incorporate technology as its organ, that technology has not been sufficiently developed to 
cope with the elemental forces of society. 146 
 
This passage above runs reflects his more grandiose diagnosis of the way war is a 
symptom of imbalance in the relation between mankind, or society, nature and 
technology found in To the Planetarium. This reestablishment of balance is yet to be 
found within existing social structures, and political systems, and Benjamin hints at a 
need for a different mode of perception into which mankind can organize their 
relation to nature and technology.  
Art and aesthetic utilization of technology is one potential point of 
experimentation for a future balancing of technological and human forces. The 
developmental potential of film technology was for Benjamin a new realm that could 
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prove a fertile soil for a possible cathartic discharge of the tensions produced by the 
surging development of productive forces and the alienation of modern life. Another 
potential and conceivable future is that of warfare. Being marked by his polemic 
against the Jüngerian ethos of techno-warriors, he sees a potential future in which 
warfare is able "to supply the artistic gratification of a sense perception that has been 
changed by technology".147 The shattering of traditional experience brings with is a 
new mode of perception, and with it, the way mankind responds to this change. 
Benjamin draws on his conception of how the destruction of traditional experience 
forces modern man into nihilism. Drawing on the concept from Nietzsche, he defines 
this reaction as either active or passive. One response is the passive nihilist appeal to 
aura in creating a new aesthetic distance where the transformation of experience could 
be maintained and denied within existing structures. However, the active nihilist 
would respond by revolution. The energies of war could through revolution be 
redirected into creative and constructive pathways. Thus, the situation in which 
modern European society found itself after the First World War was one of necessity 
of choice148. Choosing passive or active nihilist solutions "is the situation of politics 
which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. Communism responds by politicizing art.149  
Benjamin saw the October Revolution of 1917 in terms of a "first attempt of mankind 
to bring the new Physis under control."150 
 
13. Aura and Freedom 
In his middle and later period of production, Benjamin attempts to redeem a form of 
auratic experience for a historical and materialist practice. In addition to the Artwork 
essay, relevant text are his essays on Surrealism, on photography, his texts on 
mimesis; works on Proust, Kafka, Leskov and Baudelaire, certain passages in the 
Arcades project, and his texts on experiments with hashish. All these texts are 
percolated by his attempts to construct a theory of experience where the notion of aura 
plays a central role. The diagnosis of the passive nihilist strand of thought as infused 
with auratic distance towards the experience of shock is not meant to imply that 
dimensions of auratic experience is detrimental. Instead, there resides unprecedented 
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potential of new possible futures within auratic experience. This prevents us from 
taking a partial reading of Benjamin, and his theory of technological destruction of 
tradition. Being able to revive the genuine traces of aura, the false traces can be 
welcomed as an integral part of his utopian project. The genuine trace of aura contains 
the possible solution to Benjamin's unsolved problem: How to develop a theory of 
technology that retains the ethical inter-subjective qualities of aura, without its 
repressive aspects. Where this solution points can only be hinted to, and the passages 
of the Artwork essay, and other texts gives but vague pointers in a general direction as 
to how Benjamin would treat such a solution. Historically speaking, the auratic 
experience changes with every new generation. In modernity, it changes in the 
encounter with technology. Therefore, the genuine trace of aura is to be re-discovered, 
and not re-invented in a post-industrial world. But where is this genuine trace to be 
found? Here, Benjamin searches in unorthodox places, and finds it in the gaze of the 
child. Every childhood contains within it the seed of a new genuine auratic 
experience: 
 
Only a thoughtless observer can deny that correspondences come into play between the world 
of modern technology and the archaic symbol-world of mythology. Of course, initially the 
technologically new seems nothing more than that. But in the very next childhood achieves 
something great and irreplaceable for humanity. By the interest it takes in technological 
phenomena, by the curiosity it displays before any sort of invention or machinery, every 
childhood binds the accomplishments of technology to the old worlds of symbols. (...)It takes 
form not in the aura of novelty, but in the aura of the habitual. In memory, childhood and 
dream.151 
  
The world of myth is seen not as a repressive force that hinders the liberation of the 
individual, but instead a sign that the genuine trace is created within every childhood's 
way of integrating technology, or "the new" as something integrated in the surface of 
experience, and something natural and part of the constitutive surroundings, not as the 
aura of novelty (false) but as the aura of habit (genuine). Within the habitual play of 
the child, Benjamin also recovers something else: a deep connection to the ancient 
practice of mimesis, or mimetic interaction with nature. This connection will have 
important implications to how Benjamin attempts to resolve the crux of technology. 
To understand what Benjamin means, his conception of “natural” needs to be 
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taken into account. Instead of having a view of nature a pure, and pristine, Benjamin 
sees nature as produced, mediated and reformed by human hands. The way labor is 
organized needs to take this into account. Instead of being based on necessity, labor 
should be modeled after the way children interact with the environment. This signifies 
a true revolution in relation to technology. Labor must turn into play. Benjamin thus 
revives old utopian and Marxian thoughts, where the conception of work as a form of 
self-realization.152 Thus, a labor able to model children’s play is not oriented towards 
production of exchange values, but towards interaction and improvement on nature. 
Thus, technological play is the opposite of mastery over nature, and instead emerges 
from the understanding of humans as part of nature. 
Unraveling Benjamin's notion of aura ensures that an essential place must be 
reserved for conserving forms of experience deemed auratic. The dilemma of 
technology resides in the way all forms of experience becomes engulfed and 
subsumed within its domain. It is tempting to draw a line of comparison to our present 
day virtual reality of Cyberspace which to some degree subsumes actual reality under 
it’s realm of premises. There is less and less personal contact, as the technological 
reality of the World Wide Web becomes self-evident representative of effective 
agency.  This makes for a misplacement of the normative grounds by means of which 
auratic experience could be significant. For Benjamin this process is evident in the 
concept of Phantasmagoria, and in the increase of 'shock'; concepts that yields access 
both to false and authentic traces of aura. 
 
14. Experience and Shock 
There is a neurological basis to the understanding Benjamin has of modern 
experience. It has it’s origins in the concept of shock. This Freudian insight contains 
the idea that consciousness is a shield which protects the organism against stimuli.  
Through preventing their impact or impress on memory, consciousness is able to ward 
off “excessive energies” by isolating present consciousness from memory.153 
Notwithstanding the extreme dimension of war, Benjamin views the impact of 
shock to have progressively established itself as the norm of modern-day existence. 
Beginning with the First World War a process became apparent which continues to 
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this day. Seeking to explore the phenomenon, he turns to Marcel Proust154, and his 
outline of the difference between voluntary and involuntary memory. Being able to 
recall information about the past at will without hover retaining any trace of it, 
voluntary memory functions like "conventional memory". Involuntary memory, on 
the other hand, eludes attempts by the conscious mind to conjure up the past. It is 
through this dimension of memory that the genuine, "objective" traces of the past 
have an opportunity to emerge. By being triggered by chance encounters with objects, 
it can activate or trigger responses that are associated with a memory stored in 
conjunction with this response. In short, the response to the object or stimuli activates 
a dormant link to an already forgotten memory.  
Benjamin actually claims shock to be the central modern experience. The 
human organism is exposed to a technologically altered environment that exposes the 
sensory system to an overload of information. The city itself is a cauldron of shock-
effects and to an extent leaves the individual overpowered. The Lunapark fairground 
is the site of modern “cosmic” Erfahrung in To the Planetarium. Benjamin described 
this as the place where workers become familiar with, or conditioned to, the reality of 
factory labor. The optical sense, together with tactility is submerged in the 
overwhelming impressions of urbanity. The traffic, the all-pervasive advertisements, 
newspapers all form a sort of assault on the physical sensorium of the human body. 
The overwhelming impressions induce the state of psychic shocks, and they are met 
with countermeasures from the psyche in form of unconscious defense mechanisms. 
Using ideas from Freud’s Jenseits des Lustprinzips, Benjamin defines shock as a 
reaction of necessity. Consciousness forms a psychic shield that wards off the stimuli 
that is deemed harmful to the organism. Benjamin builds further on this Freudian 
notion, and defines the experience of 'shock' as a mechanical response and not only 
personal.155 This elaboration of the Freudian theory does not make modern man into 
an automaton, but instead creates an instrumentalist, mechanical way of relating to the 
surrounding environment. This total reconstituting way of interaction with the 
environment shapes modern man in two ways. On one hand it creates a defense 
system which filters the unwanted stimulus. On the other hand it inhibits the 
assimilation of sense impression into actual experience. The urban life-world creates 
habitual, monotone patterns of behavior, and a narrowing of attention, resulting in a 
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well-functioning urban individual. But as a consequence, the individual is left without 
a reality where he assimilates his surroundings into Erfahrung. There is no way of 
letting the urban world becoming totally integrated within the individual’s 
experiential field. Instead, Erlebnis dominates the individual's mode of being, 
responding to shocks by blocking out experiences. In this way the involuntary 
memory is never accessed, and a possibility of recovering sources of a larger field of 
Experience is lost. It impoverishes mans ability of remembrance, since perception 
becomes experience only when it connects with sense-memories in the past.156 
Consequently, through Erlebnis the individual experience reality as a series of shocks. 
It becomes a reality of disruption instead of continuity. Technologically dominated 
surroundings creates a world which overwhelming character is not acknowledged 
consciously, but instead purely lived 'through' without any concrete assimilation of 
the experiences that one is faced with. This creates the shallow character of the 
technological environment. Experience is functioning only superficially, unable to 
assimilate data through personal experience. Where in the nineteenth century Erlebnis 
was the realm of the adventurer, in Benjamin’s own time it appears as Fate. 
 
In Fate is concealed the concept of the “total experience” that is fatal from the outset. War is 
its unsurpassed prefiguration. (“I am born German; it is for this I die”- the trauma of birth 
already contains the shock that is mortal. This coincidence (…) defines “fate”.) 157 
 
As shock permeates the everyday life of the individual, the state of numbness 
accompanies it. This numbness or anaesthetics of modernity becomes part of the 
psychic constitution. Numbness pervades when shock is repeated to such an extent 
that it takes on normality. In shielding the blows of industrialism, insensibility creeps 
in. Man transforms into an automaton, displaying alertness, and at the same time lack 
of emotional engagement. Numbness induces a mode of existence that creates “deadly 
armatures, scaffolds, machines for work”158, and pushes mankind into the remotest 
distance of genuine, engaged interaction with fellow men. A long way from a 
harmonious mimetic interaction with the cosmos declared in To the Planetarium. 
Through its reproductive capacity, and its ability to bring things in close 
vicinity, technology creates a decrease in voluntary memory. In accordance with 
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Freud, this development weakened the connections between Erlebnis and Erfahrung; 
"To experience means to master an impression inwardly that was so strong we could 
not grasp it at once." This definition of experience in Freud's sense is something very 
different form what is meant by those who speak of having 'had an experience'".159  
Representing a richer, more complex and deeper state of experience, Erfahrung is lost 
when technological progress creates an everyday world where everything is drawn 
closer, and in this way technology transforms the closeness already existing in 
relations, due to its nature of bringing close and at the same time creating a distance 
or standing apart. In the Artwork Essay, the notion of the aura's decay is founded on 
the social practice of bringing things closer:”Namely, the desire of the present-day 
masses to "get closer" to things, and their equally passionate concern for overcoming 
each thing's uniqueness".160 
The expansion within the ranges of possible experience through technological 
means creates an increasing loss of meaning which signifies an ontological emptying 
of the grounds of experience. The state of 'shock' is in itself a signpost for experiential 
impoverishment, and leading up to a necessary crisis of experience. A crisis which 
Benjamin already saw happening within his contemporary, urban Europe. The 
experience of shock not only denies genuine, complex experience, but through its 
weakening of the voluntary memory, creates a disruption of the experience of history 
and tradition. In this weakening resides the underlying factor that makes the 'newness' 
of new things so appealing. Any new object or fashion needs the force of forgetting to 
become attractive. Any new worldview "derives its force from what is forgotten. This 
downstream flow is usually so strong that only the group can give itself up to it"161 
Redeeming this lost tradition is something Benjamin sees as necessary to actually 
create a possibility for profound social change. But the past has to bee recognized and 
acknowledged, not as fact, but as lived dream. There is therefore an urgent need to 
awaken, both from the dream sleep of modernity and tradition. Benjamin starts 
Konvolut K of the Passsagen-werk by expounding how individual and generational 
awakening is similar and goes through the same stages, which ends in historical 
remembrance: 
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A generation's experience of youth has much in common with the experience of dreams. Its 
historical configuration is a dream configuration. Every epoch has such a side turned towards 
dreams, the child's side. For the previous century, this appears very clearly in the arcades. But 
whereas the education of earlier generations explained these dreams for them in terms of 
tradition, of religious doctrine, present-day education simply amounts to the distraction of 
children. Proust could emerge as an unprecedented phenomenon only in a generation that had 
lost all bodily and natural aids to remembrance (...). What follows here is an experiment in the 
technique of awakening.162 
 
Interestingly, Benjamin also heralds a form of distraction of the masses, as a form of 
awakening. In the Artwork essay, the shock effect is most acutely experienced in the 
medium of film, and through the shock-effect, the masses are distracted from their 
conventional ways of perceiving reality. The filmatic experience induces a shock-
effect because the viewer’s contemplation is constantly interrupted by new, moving 
images. According to Benjamin, this induces a heightened sense of presence. This 
presence makes film the art form of “awakening”, as it corresponds “to the 
pronounced threat to life in which people live today”163. Another way to experience a 
heightened sense of presence is in ecstatic trance.   
 
15. Rausch in a profane world 
To the Planetarium attempts to base the future collective communion with the cosmos 
through ecstatic trance. If we are to take his statement seriously, we need to look 
closer at what this ecstatic trance or Rausch-experience actually signifies. And more 
importantly, what role does this play in relation to a new, technologically transformed 
future? 
Benjamin responds to the separation of Erlebnis and Erfahrung by advocating 
forms of actions that break the boundaries of instrumentality.   He encourages a kind 
of reduction of attention to the environment and actions that rids the individual of 
strains of instrumental ways of relating to the world. On themes such as the 
Surrealists, Proust and on hashish, he advocates a de-centered attention that creates a 
magically induced experience, where the conventional structures of reality dissolve 
and reconfigures into new re-animated realities. These experiences was for Benjamin 
gateways to new states of relating to reality, which before were hindered by the 
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habitually established, conventional ways in which man related to his surroundings. 
Such experiences marked by non-causal, non-linear conceptual associations; "By 
everything that happens, and by what he says and does, the subject is surprised and 
overwhelmed....He also attains experiences that approach inspiration, illumination"164   
In this way the individuals relations to the world becomes more multi-dimensional 
and complex, and at the same time the habitual subject/object dichotomy dissolves. In 
many ways, Benjamin here falls close to the danger of lapsing into mysticism. And 
taking his interest in the Kabbalah into account, this is a likely conclusion. As 
Benjamin notes in his essay on Surrealism that "it is a cardinal error to believe that, of 
"surrealist experiences" we know only the religious ecstasies or the ecstasies of 
drugs". Instead it resides in "profane illumination, a materialistic, anthropological 
inspiration..."165 In these ways of experiencing the world Benjamin attempts to re-
discover the origin of the auratic experience. This is the form of auratic experience 
that needs to be salvaged, as it contains within it the long suppressed yearnings of the 
collective, who through the advent of modernity has been denied such authentic 
auratic experience. And the attempt to expand the realm of possible experience 
through new technologies, such as film, becomes yet another path towards reclaiming 
this authentic auratic experience, and gain new knowledge “of what is nearest and 
most remote to us, and never one without the other.166” 
If we look closer at his texts on Surrealism; Benjamin regards their venture as 
a contribution an expanded theory of experience. Surrealism held within it an embrace 
of the crisis in the arts, and through it an indicator of the more profound crisis in 
experience occurring in their time. Implicit in their slogan "l'art pour l'art" Benjamin 
saw not only an aesthetic flight from the political and art as withdrawing from the 
world, but instead a vehicle for an expanded notion of experience.167 Surrealism 
undermines the borders between art and non-art. This is done, according to Benjamin, 
by transgressing what can be deemed poetic to the extreme, creating new and 
potentially transforming aesthetic spaces. Within its sphere, Surrealism creates an 
aesthetisization of existence to the outmost degree, hoping through such poetization of 
the mundane world, to "obliterate the aesthetic, having dislodged any antithetical 
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principle against which it could flaunt its autonomy.168 In short, experience itself 
becomes equivalent to pure Aisthitikos, bodily sensuous experience. It was through 
this form of re-enchantment of the mundane, modern reality, a path towards a new 
collective communion with the cosmos was sought. But to enable such re-
enchantment, first a true disenchantment with the false auratic forms of modern 
society was necessary. 
  
16. Technological Phantasmagoria 
It is interesting to see Benjamin's interest in intoxication and "Rauch" as emblematic 
to the zeitgeist of early modernity. As Susan Buck-Morss, in her compelling essay 
reveals, the numbing of the human sensorium escalated proportionally with the rise of 
capitalist industry. Drug addiction became an increasing consequence of the self-
imposed numbing to the shocks of modern existence, as such numbness became a 
prerequisite for handling, but also a correlate to the shock-experience itself.169 The 
intoxicating experience was not limited to biochemical transformations, of bodily 
nature. In the nineteenth century, a narcotic was made out of reality itself.170 The key 
word for this intoxication of the senses was deemed Phantasmagoria. 
The word “Phantasmagoria” originated in England in 1802, as the name of an 
exhibition for optical illusions produced by magic lanterns. In the late eighteenth 
century several showmen used the lantern to produce horror shows. These were 
known as "Phantasmagoria" shows. A variety of horrific images were projected to 
frighten the audience, examples being ghosts projected on smoke to give a frightening 
appearance and images that would move around the walls. Often the projector was 
behind a translucent screen, out of the view of the audience. This greatly added to the 
mystery of the show. As new technologies multiplied in the nineteenth century, so did 
the potential for phantasmagorical effects. 
The shock-experience of urban existence and the alienated forms of 
industrialized labor creates a fragmented superficial reality. Commodity fetishism 
renders this reality into a state of illusory splendors and plenitude. During 
technological change, the individual experiences shock, but at the same time provides 
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a compensatory mechanism; phantasmagoria. This phenomenon becomes for 
Benjamin a dialectical 'other' of mass industrialism. Phantasmagorias are defined as 
illusion, an appearance, which through their technical manipulation deceives the 
senses. In escalating technological change resides a potential for increasing 
phantasmagoric effects. Through the Arcades Project Benjamin describes how 
phantasmagoric forms enter the public space. The arcades themselves, and the more 
recent shopping malls, are examples of the way public space transforms into 
simulated environments. And within this simulated space, the phantasmagoria induces 
an 'intoxicating' effect. Referring to Baudelaire’s analysis of urban life as marked by 
religious intoxication he states: "The department stores are temples consecrated to this 
intoxication."171 What causes the intoxication? Benjamin would suggest that the 
interrelatedness between collective dreams of modern man and the character of 
surface-unity of the phantasmagoria creates its powerful allure.  
  What does this surface unity relate to? We can see the phantasmagoria as 
techno-aesthetics, as their perceptions are real enough from a neuro-physical 
perspective. The appearance floods the nervous system with sensory input. The 
surface quality of these objects or appearances is one of allure, of captivation and 
desire. What is hidden is their social function, which is compensatory in nature. In 
short, the objective is manipulation of the nervous system by control of environmental 
stimuli. This induces the anaesthetizising effect of the organism.172 Not by numbing 
but by flooding the senses. Through this process, a sensory alteration can take place in 
consciousness, through distraction. Most importantly, this does not take place 
individually, but within the collective. Through the collective experience of 
technologically altered realities, a form of consensus emerges which evolves towards 
objective fact. Instead of the drug-induced experience, which is cut of from 
community, the phantasmagoria becomes social norm.173 As such, sensory addiction 
to a technologically altered reality elicits social control. 
In the Passagen-werk, Benjamin exhibits an ambivalent attitude towards 
technology. He recognizes its double function: In one way, it expands man's 
experience, extending the sensual domain, and increases the depth of perception. In 
opposition, the exposure to the technological extension of possible human experience 
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leaves him vulnerable. Technology creates illusion, and in this sense, overrides the 
human ego's role in order to provide defensive insulation Benjamin foresaw that 
technology itself could disintegrate the illusions that technology created, awakening 
man to the underlying reality of urban life. Through this, a true disenchantment paves 
the way for a re-enchantment of reality. 
 
17. New nature 
To understand where Benjamin wants us to follow him in his endeavor to liberate the 
masses from the collective dreams of urban modernity, he needed to reveal for his 
readers an alternative way of perceiving the context in which the modern masses 
found themselves. Only through finding such an alternative perception was there a 
way out of the reality totally engulfed in the mythic world engendered by the new 
capitalist culture. One such revolutionary way that Benjamin saw as expanding our 
conception of experience was to be found in the child’s inherent mimetic practice.  
As mentioned above, Benjamin endeavor is twofold: We are not only to 
embrace the destruction of auratic experience, but also recover its source. Genuine 
traces of the auratic experience are not to be recreated, but redeemed. What Benjamin 
found in the gaze of the child was the unbroken connection between perception and 
action that marked revolutionary consciousness in adults. This connection was not a 
passive response to the surroundings, but instead an active, creative form of mimesis, 
involving the ability to make unintentional correspondences by means of spontaneous 
fantasy. In play, Benjamin found a connection to the primordial mimetic motor 
reactions, which served as evidence of the “mimetic faculty”, a source of a language 
of gestures. For him they were “more basic to cognition than conceptual language”174 
In the perception of the child, a completely different and alternative relationship 
between consciousness and reality, between humanity and the cosmos played itself 
out. Instead of being limited to a purely linear, historic mode of perception, the 
interaction of society and human consciousness is not bound solely by the dynamics 
of domination and submission. In the child, the capacity for revolutionary action was 
present from the start.  
Seen in this light, the state of the child is seen as the always-returning to 
beginnings. In the child, revolutionary action appears not as an event in, but outside of 
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history, as the perception of the child is to se the world anew. That being said, 
Benjamin was not attempting an idealization of childhood, but instead believed that 
only those who were allowed to live out their childhood really grew up. At this 
juncture, the limitations of the child’s consciousness need structure and education. 
But just as Benjamin disapproves the urge for technological mastery over nature, 
expressed in To the Planetarium: "Is not education above all the indispensable 
ordering of the relation between generations and therefore mastery, (...), of that 
relationship and not of children?"175  
Within the child's reception of reality, Benjamin finds a realm into which both 
persistence and a true transformation of the mimetic faculty takes place. As 
previously mentioned, the mimetic faculty, through being in decay, is a sign of our 
reduced ability to perceive and interact with reality in its "otherness". In the way the 
child interacts, perceives and organizes their environment, there is no self imposed 
boundaries between what can and cannot be invoked as play: " A child plays at being 
not only a grocer or a teacher, but also a windmill and a train"176 Benjamin developed 
a notion of the child's playfulness in several sections of One-Way Street, (e.g., "Child 
Hiding), in Berlin Childhood, (e.g., "The Sock", "Hiding Places"), or in the Passagen-
werk Konvoluts.177 The child's readiness for creative mimicry, as in the pretence of 
being the "other", somebody else, the mimetic capacity reveals itself. The child 
engages in technological play in such a way that it undercuts the ideological misuse of 
technology by exploring the technical novelties of modernity with mythic yet 
potentially utopian meanings.  
As we have discussed, there resides alternative ways of interacting with 
technology. But taken Benjamin’s message from the Artwork Essay into account, this 
entails both a dis-enchantment, and re-enchantment of reality. His theory of 
technology seeks to avoid a new destructive relationship with the evolving technical 
forms. Instead technology must become a medium of collectivity, so to counteract the 
diversion of its energy towards war and suppression.  In the following, I will present 
ways that Benjamin suggested would facilitate an alternative, harmonious relationship 
to a technologically altered cosmos. 
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18. A new technological Communion with the Cosmos 
As we have sketched of the many-faceted face of Benjamin’s theories of experience 
and technology, the question remains: In actual reality, within the here-and-now, how 
is this new expanded experience induced through technology? In the last part of this 
essay I will show examples of how Benjamin found ways to counter the alienation 
and shocks of modernity through an alternative utilization of technology. He saw a 
potential for redemption and liberation through utilization of the possibilities within 
the new technologies of reproduction, with particular emphasis on the notion of 
mimetic innervation and play. This last part of this essay will therefore be discussing 
the mutually interdependent themes of mimetis, play, innervation, second technology, 
and how they are actualized in the technologies of photo and film.  
As the technological apparatus has tremendous potential within its capacity to 
de-familiarize the habitual way in which man perceives reality, it became obvious to 
Benjamin how easily this ability to alter our world could be harnessed for capitalist 
gain. The phantasmagorical character of the new technologies changed the way we 
interact with his surroundings. Modern man became confronted with a technology that 
changed his perception through the ‘dislocation’ of the senses. Through the increasing 
dependence on technological devices, our sensuous experience is displaced by a 
technological mediation of the same experience. Seeing becomes infused with lens 
technology, hearing with that of gramophones and radio, tactility that of mechanized 
labor. This abstraction of sensation left the human subject alienated. Life in the 
technically dominated world evolved through increasingly instrumental means. Thus, 
the “tiny, fragile, human body” encounters the industrialized world. It is a world of 
fragmentation, revealing the reality behind the phantasmagoric veil: Industrial 
modernity’s true face reveals the impact it had on the bodily sensorium in the 
beginning of the industrial revolution: “The rates of injuries due to factory and 
railroad accidents in the nineteenth century made surgical wards look like field 
hospitals”.178 These developments reveal the transformation of perception far beyond 
the modern medical profession. In its outmost consequence, this transformation 
became apparent at the turn of the last century, when “professionalization, technical 
expertise, division of labor, rationalization of procedures changed social practices.”179 
Technological development mirrored this development and transformed the way 
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society saw its citizens as a “mass”, or organism, becoming a “body” in itself. The 
“Social body” could be treated as that of the individual body, due to it’s splitting into 
labor specialization, rationalization and integration of social functions, creating a 
“techno-body” out of society. As a consequence perception changed into a splitting of 
experience into agency (surgeon), the object (society/body) and observer.180 Buck-
Morss suggests that an important component in the “shattering of experience” was 
due to this splitting. For Benjamin, experience is impoverished through self-
alienation. And the severing of connection between bodily and cognitive experience 
creates the sort of Jüngerian vision he appalled. Where Jünger saw technology as 
expanding human power, and used technology to transcend pain and vulnerability, 
Benjamin saw humanity’s downfall. The body-as-armor, as mechanized tool, faced 
the illusion of invulnerability, numbed against feeling. Alienated towards the 
integrated, sensory realm of the body, man cannot truly be experiencing reality 
without undoing the numbing of pain. Only through re-experiencing modern life as 
pain and shock can the human being move towards redemption. The closing passage 
of the Artwork essay reflects this, as the crisis in experience is directly related to the 
alienation of the senses. He sees the final consequence is global war, and the aesthetic 
project of the fascists makes it possible for humanity to witness its own destruction as 
a spectacle. The fascists expected from war “the artistic gratification of the sense 
perception altered by technology”.181   
 
19. The Image  
Benjamin makes clear the essential relationship between the image -- especially the 
photographic image -- and modernity. We cannot understand what it means to be 
modern without grasping the degree to which our experience of the world is defined 
by what might be called the photographic mentality. We see the world as if we 
ourselves are cameras, and, at the same time, we see ourselves as objects in a 
photograph -- at once ourselves and yet other. According to Benjamin, the 
transformations within technology shape our perception, and our way of perceiving 
reality and ourselves.  
Encountering, and looking into the technical apparatus of the camera, we 
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experience its alien lack of returning the gaze. But in modern urbanity, the camera 
lens catches the human eye’s alienation, and when confronted with the machine, 
man’s eyes “have lost the ability to look.”182 If we look at the statements of "To the 
Planetarium", mankind's emphasis on the visual, optical sense as a means of 
understanding the cosmos has left him with a narrowed and limited perceptual 
apparatus, thus limiting the realm of possible experience. Benjamin goes further. 
Immanent in this diagnosis resides a critique of reason per se. Mankind can only be 
saved through a retreat from the armored, technologically protected Reasoning 
Subject. Instead of relying on technology as an extended prosthetic sense-boundary, 
man needs to re-discover existence as Aisthitikos; perceiving reality through the 
human senses.  
Benjamin did however claim that these new technologies contained solutions 
for resisting the instrumental tendencies emerging in the wake of their evolution, as 
we have discussed above. On example he pointed to was photography. Challenging 
the painter’s hegemony within portraiture, photography changed the very nature of 
pictorial representation. Benjamin sees in photographic portraits “the first image of 
the encounter of machine and human being”183. The new reproduction technologies 
could provide means of resisting the instrumental tendencies within capitalist culture. 
Photography and film grants man access to involuntary memory, in a way which 
connected Erfahrung to surface impressions, due to its capacity to capture the 
unintended. According to Benjamin, the fleeting, ‘secret’ and contingent dimensions 
of images could paralyze the associative capacity of the viewer, and thus disconnect 
the voluntary memory.  These processes would create a possibility for the flood of 
images and sensations of the surroundings to be stopped, and at this instant frozen in a 
monad-like imprint in consciousness that could make it properly integrated into 
experience. One way this process could come about would be to investigate 
Benjamin's notion of the "optical unconscious".  
This concept resides among other aspects of the radical possibilities residing 
within the medium of film and photography. The entire text A Small History of 
Photography is permeated by the notion of the inherent possibilities of photography to 
create openness to the future which he describes in terms of an "optical unconscious". 
This concept refers to the transition in which a "space informed by human 
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consciousness give way to a space informed by the unconscious"184. This space 
fascinated Benjamin in the way that otherness, or that which is not (falsely) auratic 
permeates the image through being charged with contingency.  
 
 
Nadar’s first pictures of the Paris Catacombs, taken with electric lighting, in the  
period of 1864-1865. 
 
No matter how artful the photographer, no matter now carefully posed his subject, the 
beholder feels an irresistible urge to search such a picture for the tiny spark of contingency, of 
the Here and Now, with which reality has so to speak sear the subject, to find the 
inconspicuous spot where in the immediacy of that long forgotten moment the future subsists 
so eloquently that we, looking back, may rediscover it. For it is another nature that speaks to 
the camera rather than the eye: “Other” above all in the sense that a space informed by human 
consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious. 185 
 
This is essence Benjamin's concept of experience. The present is permeated by the 
future through being a contingency which has the potentiality of retrospectively 
altering the present state of affairs. The camera lens has the ability to capture space 
and time, and being marked by contingency, it is removed from the realm of the 
auratic. The new technology that made new works of art possible was capable of 
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reflecting upon experience from within and changing it.186 Benjamin found this way 
of utilizing technology so compelling because it probes beyond the surface of the 
image. It made a rupture, or shattering of this surface, thus preventing the viewer from 
hiding behind the appearance of historical continuity. Thus, the mythical within the 
image is shattered by its contingency. Its ‘otherness’ provides evidence against myth. 
The notion of the "optical unconscious" becomes one of the main examples of the 
radical possibilities inherent in mass media. Its possibility of examining reality with 
an ‘objective’ eye separates the film medium from other technological phenomenon, 
like architecture. Instead of invoking the phantasmagoric, Benjamin believed film 
creates a way of dismantling the illusory aspects of reality, and thus create possibility 
for redemption and liberation. Through its shock effect he hopes to dismantle the 
phantasmagoric illusion of everyday life.187 Film as vehicle of suspending existing 
ways of apperception ultimately became a tool of mastery. The shattering effect of the 
optical unconscious is revealed in its ability to undo other forms of mastery188 (i.e. the 
conventional, discursive mode of perception).  
Through this undoing of mastery, a new form of mastery over the environment 
merges. The audience, through the film experience, is drawn out of a discursive, 
instrumental mode of experience through distraction. In opposition to the distractive 
fetish-quality of the phantasmagoria, film and photography induces a form of 
distraction that opens a space for an expanded form of experience, and a different 
mode of interaction with reality. Through this interaction, a “mastery of the 
relationship between nature and man”189 emerges. Through this relationship, 
Benjamin hopes to reconnect with the origin of the auratic experience. Being 
intimately connected to film, the search for this auratic experience is bound with his 
notion of mimesis. In the Artwork Essay", Benjamin emphasizes the role of cinema as 
a possible redemptive form of art in a time where technology only is implemented 
with alienating and violent means. Film is the only medium that might yet counter the 
catastrophic effects of humanity's already "miscarried reception of technology" that 
had come to a head with World War I.190 The shock-experience induced by this war 
could according to Benjamin be used against itself through film’s mimetic capacity. 
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How? Being mimetic at its core, film technology could rediscover a form of auratic 
perception, cleansed of the decaying auratic symptoms such as fetishism and myth-
making. Within this perception the reengagement of collective memory and 
experience is induced; forms of memory and experience that contains within them 
authentic auratic traces. The return of a redeemed auratic mode of experience is 
opened through the space that is created through the “optical unconscious”. Instead of 
interpreting aura in terms of theories of commodity fetishism and reification, 
Benjamin introduces another dimension to the auratic. He indicates that there is 
another human element in objects which is not the result of reified human labor, or 
product of fetishization. Instead, the origin of the auratic is found in what humans and 
non-human nature have in common. This physical connection can be traced back to 
his 1916 essay on Language.191 This lost element is the material origin that humans 
and nature share, an origin that connects Benjamin notion of the “otherness” of things 
with Freud’s thoughts in his essay on “The Uncanny” (De Unheimliche).192 Through 
the pre-cognitive, pre-linguistic sense experience can man find its original connection 
with the universe, and the aura, or its genuine trace. In a note to his essay on the 
mimetic faculty, Benjamin wonders if not the stars, with their gaze are the Ur-
phenomena of the aura.193 Maybe Benjamin sees the gaze as the original “reading”, 
and thus instigator of the mimetic faculty. 
  The mimetic capacity of film thus opens up aspects of possible dimensions of 
experience previously unimaginable, or formerly neglected within the realm of 
conventional, instrumentalist modes of perception. Within this “otherness” resides the 
origin of the auratic trace. The way film renders this possible is not only through the 
technology, but through the cinematic technique. To make the camera “return the 
gaze194 so to speak, film must do more than just unravel a narrative and plot. Thus, 
through the utilization of such techniques as montage195 and discontinuity, a mimetic 
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form of shock is induced that creates access the unconscious memory. Through its 
collective nature, the film experience can elicit the retraction of the hidden collective 
memory. This collective memory emerges through distraction. Thus, for Benjamin, 
“reception in distraction” becomes a sign of a profound alteration of apperception. 
Benjamin sees film as “the most important subject matter, at present, for the theory of 
perception which the Greeks called aesthetics.”196 The connection between the 
original meaning of Aesthetics, as Aisthetikos, (sense perception) and mimetic 
innervation begins to emerge.  
Having a clear political agenda, the Artwork Essay's view of the role of film 
differs from some of his later texts, emphasizing the link between technology and 
artistic revolution. In short, Benjamin recognizes that the reality conveyed through 
film technology is just as phantasmagoric as the surface-quality of so-called “reality” 
that it transmits ad infinitum. What he saw in film technology was the potential for 
disrupting and revealing this surface-quality. This is the critical task of all politicized 
art: to reveal social reality itself as illusory. Cinema is permeated by technology to 
such an extent that its mimetic techniques are designed to “make technology itself 
disappear.”197 Through this possibility of creating an illusion of reality a new space is 
created for interpreting reality in truly novel ways.  
Within this possibility resides an alternative reception of technology. This 
alternative rests heavily on his conception of "innervation". Within the Artwork text, 
the actual grounds for the implications of mimetic innervation are found in the notes 
of the second version.198 I will argue that "innervation" is one of, or maybe the 
essential component in Benjamin's attempt at creating a viable alternative to the 
current role technology played in modernity.  With it, Benjamin saw a possible 
redeeming potential residing within technologies themselves, and through them 
reawaken humanity’s mimetic contact with the cosmos. 
 
20. Innervation 
 Related to the notion of an optical unconscious familiar from the Artwork essay, 
"innervation" refers broadly, to a neurophysiologic process that mediates between the 
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internal and external, mental and physical, machine and man. The concept of 
"innervation" emerged with a "cycle of production" that Benjamin started with "One 
Way Street", and culminated with the Passagen-werk, and included such texts as 
essays on surrealism, Proust and Kafka, the Berlin Childhood essays, and other texts, 
and finally "Experience and Poverty". Benjamin initially takes up the issue of 
"innervation" in his 1929 essay “Surrealism”.199 Here he develops a notion of 
"collective innervation" of mankind's body through technology. Here the issue of a 
new Physis organized by technology is discussed together with a focus on the 
sensuous nature of our collective contact with it. Benjamin’s interest in the term 
shows itself in his next major work, One Way Street, which signals Benjamin’s return 
to Marxism. That said, the twin emphasis of technology and psychoanalysis 
influences not only the thematic and theoretical concerns, but also its avant-garde 
mode of representation., it's textual strategies that articulate, or "innervate", the 
political, erotic, and aesthetic implications of the pathway cut by modernity, the street 
that entwines technological and psychic registers in the books title trope. In One Way 
Street the term appears only twice, but the idea or concept pervades the text in a series 
of variations, and culminates with its concluding piece, To the Planetarium.200 The 
two places where “innervation” is used explicitly articulate two distinct notions of 
Technik.201 In one case Benjamin relates technology to the ancient practice of Yoga, 
in the other to the tools of writing. Under the subheading “Prayer Wheel”, Benjamin 
states axiomatically: “No imagination without innervation”. This is elaborated further 
by exemplifying how the link between innervation and imagination was once 
“embodied” in an ancient somatic, yet spiritual practice; Yoga. Rooted in the bodily 
sensorium, without emphasis on intellect, this practice incorporates what Benjamin 
defines as the original mimetic practice. 
Where Benjamin borrowed the concept from is unclear, but Miriam Bratu 
Hansen suggests that although clearly of Freudian origins, the term was also used in 
the neurophysiologic and psychological discourse of the period.202 Freud's use of the 
term is context-dependent, but while in the context of studies of hysteria innervation 
is described as a way of responding to internal excitation. In Freud’s Interpretation of 
Dreams, the sources of stimulation also include factors outside the body. The 
                                                          
199
 W. Benjamin, Surrealism, SW2, p. 217 
200
 M. Hansen, Benjamin and Cinema, p. 314 
201
 Technik as used by Benjamin is referring to both technology and technique.  
  
 
 
79 
distinction between external and internal sources of stimuli is continued in later 
writings, when discussed in relation to trauma, or neurosis originating from 
mechanical violence, which overwhelms the nervous system.203 This perspective 
coincides with Benjamin's description of trauma, or shock in confrontation with 
industrial warfare, and the following decay of experience.  
For Benjamin, innervation becomes a term functioning as compensatory 
concept, standing as an alternative, or cure to the technologically multiplied shock and 
it's numbing effects. But what does this alternative countering of the sensorial 
numbing created by technology imply? Benjamin here parts ways with most of his 
contemporaries, as he embraces an altogether different outlook on the relation 
between the artificial and the natural, the body and the object, consciousness and 
matter. To counter the shock of the shattering of experience, our notions of the 
relations between man, technology and nature must transform. Buck Morss reads 
Benjamin as using "innervation" as a term for the mimetic reception of the external 
world. This reception is active and empowering, in contrast to the defensive mimetic 
adaptation that protects at the consequence of freezing or numbing the organism and 
it's ability to imagine, and thus to actively create a response to the impressions 
received.204 Benjamin saw this response as a consisting of a process of receiving and 
responding, where the distinction between the somatic and mechanical became blurry. 
To do this, a completely different notion of technology and nature emerged in 
Benjamin's thought.   
 
21. Innervating Second Technology; Play 
As Benjamin expounded enigmatically in To the Planetarium, the basis for his idea of 
technological redemption is built on revolution. Firstly, the notion of revolution is 
inspired by the Marxist movements originating in the wake of WWI. Secondly it leans 
on Benjamin's reading of Judaism. But ultimately, there is no liberation from the state 
of affairs in which technology has shattered traditional experience. Mankind is forced 
into new ground, as there is no way of retracing our steps and returning to edenic, pre-
technological harmony. The only alternative is to transform mankind's outmoded 
separation between nature and technology, between Techne and Physis. To do this, 
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the Benjamin wanted to use the energies unleashed by the technological upheaval of 
modernity, and through it "liquidate" the traditional technological paradigm: 
 
It is the goal of revolutions to accelerate this, the body emancipated by the liquidation of the 
first technology205 
 
Susan Buck-Morss argues that technology transforms nature through social and 
historical activity; this resulting "second nature" cannot be reduced to an "alienated, 
"reified" subjectivity, a world created by humans, who did not recognize it as their 
own", and much like what Lukács notion of "Second nature" refers to206. But unlike 
Lukács, Benjamin takes the concept beyond its initial Hegelian, historical and praxis-
oriented focus, and articulates a conception of technology where it anticipates the 
function it has acquired in the process of material complexification. Instead, material 
nature for Benjamin was other than the subject, and remained in this "otherness" 
independent on how much mankind invested in it by means of labor or 
conceptualization. Therefore, a specifically technological form of "alienation" must in 
this respect be distinguished from the alienation emphasized by the most influential 
Hegelian readers of Marx, like Lukács, and Adorno. But what does Lukács and Hegel 
imply when setting up this division of a first and second nature? Lukács borrows from 
Hegelian categories when introducing "second nature" within his social critique. 
Hegel drew a line between a pure and unspoiled nature of physical and biological 
laws, forms and processes, and a "second nature" made up of cultural products of 
man, implying the market, the urban landscape and technical devices. Through the 
historical process, Lukács points out that "Second Nature" becomes ‘second nature’, 
meaning our natural, self-evident nature; our only nature. Benjamin uses this term in a 
similar way to argue that conceptions of nature as static, given, non-social and non-
historical are problematic. When the artificial, technological, cultural, man-made 
acquires familiarity, it becomes "second nature", meaning part of what is given.  
Consequently, for Benjamin, the historical becomes natural through use, 
bringing the natural forth as subject to social and technological pressures. In the same 
manner, the historical makes natural what is of technical nature, making it close to 
irrelevant to strive for categorical distinction between the natural and the 
technological. A new nature contains the technological, and this relation is precisely 
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articulated in relation to art: 
 
One can formulate the problem of form in the new art bluntly: when and how will the worlds 
of forms that have arisen in mechanics, in film, machine construction  and the new physics, 
and that, without our assistance, have emerged and overpowered us, make what is natural in 
them clear to us? When will the condition of society be reached in which these forms or those 
which have arisen from them open themselves up to us as natural forms? 207 
 
 In the 1935 Expose for his Passagen-werk Benjamin investigates how existence and 
consciousness are reformulated "in the light of the new technical and social 
reality".208In the new technological devices there rests potential for a new "second 
nature" we find embodied a contact between humankind and the world on which 
society and its structures are formed. In such a way, Benjamin separates himself from 
many other theoreticians of technology, and designates technology as the very modern 
form of Nature, Physis, itself. Accordingly, the latter part of To the Planetarium 
highlights the essence of his theory of technology, and becomes the mediating factor 
between man and nature. Through technology, a Physis is being formed through 
which mankind's interaction with the cosmos takes a new and different form from that 
which it had in "nations and families".209 
Having attempted to yoke technology to human practice, the medium of film 
and photography creates a sphere where this interaction becomes apparent. In 
Benjamin's later work the link between technology and artistic revolution central to 
the politicized emphasis of the Artwork essay is abandoned in favor of more central, 
yet general questions.210 Rather than continuing to ask how film can underwrite a 
revolutionary politization of aesthetics, he poses the question which summarizes his 
concern with technological change: How can a harmonious, nondestructive 
relationship with the cosmos be established and maintained when this cosmos is 
technologically driven?  
For Benjamin the concept of innervation has the specific function of 
suspending or countering the impressions and shock experience of modern culture. 
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Through its counter effect, innervation frees the ability to perceive what is previously 
blocked in the Freudian combination of shock, breach and the repression; the 
discharge that alone could undo the anaesthetizing effects pointed to by Benjamin. In 
Buck-Morss way of reading this notion, the term innervation is Benjamin's way of 
creating a mimetic reception of the external world. 211 This implies a response, rather 
than a reaction. This is similar to how children relate to animate and inanimate objects 
in their surroundings in a mimetic way. This way of understanding the role of 
Innervation reflects his interest in the perception of reality of the child. Within it rests 
a key redemptive potential for modern man's technological reality. What is 
redemptive within the innervation between man and the technological?   
To make the concept applicable to receptions of technology, Benjamin's use of 
the term innervation designates a two-way process within a psychological 
perspective. This refers to a process of re-conversion, recollecting and recovering 
split-off psychic energy through motoric stimulation. This is possible due to 
Benjamin's emphasis on the inherent porosity of boundaries between man and 
surroundings, enabling a greater circulation of psychic energies. There is a response 
instead of mere reaction, making the interaction between somatic and mechanic 
existence dominated not by protection and shielding, but by inducing and mediating 
stimuli. Accordingly, Film technology has a potential for a new, technologically 
rendered softening of the shield of protection induced by the shock experience of 
modern life.212  
The ancient’s way of bodily-oriented cosmic communion exemplified the 
integrated use of technique and imagination. But this only serves as an already 
"antique", ritualistic, pre-mechanical notion of the technical. Thus, this is only serving 
the purpose of defining a difference between the ancient "first" Technic, and the 
second. This is done in a more in-depth manner in the Artwork essay, where he 
attempts through this division to redefine the relationship between aesthetic technique 
and industrial technology. This second technology originates in mankind's 
unconscious attempt to distance itself from nature, whereas the first technology seeks 
to immerse man into a communion with nature. They both take the same starting point 
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from the human body's degree of involvement with matter. The first technology was 
based on the total involvement by man, the second technology on man's increasing 
detachment from it. This distancing from nature is brought poetically to our attention 
in the Artwork Essay. The ancient way of relating to nature through the "first 
technology" was by the "maximum use of human beings", and the "second 
technology" of our modern time "reduces their use to the minimum"213. Reflecting his 
statements in One Way Street, he takes an unusual turn: The achievements of the first 
technology might be said to culminate in the human sacrifice:”those of the second, in 
the remote-controlled aircraft, which needs no human crew."214 Benjamin here 
connects lines of reasoning from To the Planetarium. Where the ancients’ collective 
communion with the cosmos was based on intimacy with the technical, technological 
warfare in the First World War was marked by distance. He continues: 
 
The results of the first technology are valid once and for all. (it deals with irreparable laps or 
sacrificial death). The results of the second are wholly provisional (it operates by means of 
experiments and endlessly varied test procedures).215 
 
The ancient way of technological communion was grounded not in instrumentality but 
ritual. The objective was consequently fused with the process of obtaining it, and 
therefore "eternal", resting on another conception of time, space and different mode of 
perception. In short, in cosmic communion, meaning was both found and invoked. 
The nature of the second technology, based on the notion of progress and industry are 
never more than instrumental in relation to means and ends. Hence, the technological 
interaction is marked by the ephemeral: Modernity will always leave the old in favor 
of the new in the ongoing technological quest. The nature of the second technology 
finds it's culmination in war due to being based on distance. Distancing from man is 
the constitution of the second technology, but its origin lies elsewhere:  
 
The origins of the second technology lie at the point where, by an unconscious ruse, human 
beings first began to distance themselves from nature. It lies, in other words, in play (Spiel).216 
 
What can Benjamin refer to? Obviously, something is lost in translation, when 
                                                          
213
 W. Benjamin, Artwork essay, SW3, p. 107 
214
 W. Benjamin, One Way Street, SW1, p. 487 
215
 Walter Benjamin, Artwork essay, SW 3, p. 107 
216
  Ibid, p. 107 
  
 
 
84 
translating the term Spiel to English. In the multiple, German meanings of the word, 
'play' can also mean 'gamble', 'performance', 'game', 'execution' and 'act'. In this term, 
Benjamin provides us with a term, and a concept that makes him able to imagine an 
alternative mode of aesthetics that is aligned with the collective experience of the 
"second technology". Here, he found a mode of perception that counteracted the 
consequences of the catastrophic reception of technology within modernity.217 To 
Benjamin, this distancing is of a different form than what is emphasized by the rest of 
the Frankfurt School, who viewed technology as mainly grounded in instrumentalist 
agendas. For him, "mastery of nature" or Naturbeherrschung as a goal for the modern, 
second technology is defined "from the position of the first"218. The motivation for 
mastery of nature emerged out of necessity in the ancient world.  
When Benjamin traces the origin of the second technology back to the notion 
of play, he reveals a radically different conception of nature and man; the second 
technology emerges not as a consequence of opposition to nature, but rather by 
interplay of humanity and nature. The interplay expounded in To the Planetarium. In 
the Artwork Essay, this conception of interplay between the human and non-human 
leads him to the importance of how art and technology can "rehearse" this interplay:  
 
This applies to film. The function of film is to train human beings in the apperceptions and 
reactions needed to deal with a vast apparatus whose role in their lives is expanding almost 
daily. Dealing with this apparatus also teaches them that technology will release them from 
their enslavement to the powers of the apparatus only when humanity's whole constitution has 
adapted itself to the new productive forces which the second technology has set free.219 
 
This clarifies Benjamin's reasons for his interest in the medium of film. Film, as 
technological innervation, or more precisely as a "play form of second nature"220, can 
potentially serve the function of "establishing equilibrium between human beings and 
the apparatus"221. 
Here we again find reflected the concluding remarks of To the Planetarium: 
 
In technology, a Physis is being organized through which mankind's contact with the cosmos 
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takes a new and different form from which it had in nations and families.222 
 
Only through a revolutionary change of perception, into which the mass-
consciousness can collectively adapt itself to the possibilities of the new, second 
technology, is a genuine possibility of a new redeemed future for humanity possible. 
Film assumes this task because of its potential for reversing the collective, misaligned 
relationship between humanity and Techne223. This reversal could happen in the form 
of play. Instead of leading humanity to further suppression, alienation and self-
destruction, the second technology could be rescued from the capitalist-industrial 
paradigm and become public, common and collective. The medium's technical nature, 
along with its collective mode of reception could lead the technological into social 
consciousness: Thus, the second nature of the individual (i.e. technology) becomes the 
first nature of the collective, through filmatic play.  
The way innervation could regulate this interplay of human and mechanical 
nature was for Benjamin dependent on a return to the mode of perception ingrained in 
the ancient's mimetic practices of the first technology. In To the Planetarium, this 
implied the way ancient communion with the cosmos took place in and through the 
mimetic practices of the body. This means a turning away from the emphasis on the 
optical, dualistic mode of perception dominating the second technology and instead 
paying heed to the body as the "preeminent instrument of sensory perception and 
(moral and political) differentiation”.224 In the following, I will discuss how Benjamin 
envisaged this notion of mimetic innervation, could expand to a conception of a 
collective bodily innervation. 
 
22. Collective innervation: Mankind redeemed? 
In recollection of Jünger's embrace of the fusing of technology and body, Benjamin 
here takes us down a different path. Instead of heralding the coming of the second, 
alien, technological ethos found in Jünger's texts, Benjamin points to a turning away 
from the objectifying relationship between man and technology towards a more 
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subjective, bodily-oriented praxis. Instead of relating to the body as mere object, 
mankind's relationship towards nature could be salvaged through a return to the body 
as arena for mimetic imaginative practices that include the technical. In short, this can 
be seen as a new attempt at mimetic "wooing with the Cosmos". This form of bodily-
oriented innervation is still technological, yet it stands in stark comparison to the 
dualistic, objectified realm of the industrialized modern subject's powerlessness 
towards the imposing forces of industrialized progress. The nature of such 
powerlessness is seen in the face of the workers who “throughout the workday in 
offices and factories, have to relinquish their humanity in the face of an apparatus.”225  
Instead, the potential of an imaginative innervation originating from the body resides 
in it's capability of being self-regulated. The interest found in Benjamin's texts on 
Surrealism, alternative modes of perception (i.e. children's play), altered states of 
consciousness, and experiments with hashish are all examples of how he attempted to 
find sources for how this return to a purely subjective, self-regulated praxis was to 
come about226.   
In opposition to the modern, private realm of individuation, the message in To 
the Planetarium is "man can be in ecstatic contact with the cosmos only 
communally"227. We may now appreciate a deeper level of Benjamin's interest in the 
collective reception of the second technology. Here, a "collective body" of humanity 
is possible, where the notion of the corporeal is extended to perceive the technological 
no longer as second nature, but as a "first nature of the collective."228 In reading 
Benjamin this way, we can glimpse an unusual emphasis of the collective 
(proletarian) body as a site for the technological revolution. A possible way out of the 
barbarism of 20th century modernity is found in a footnote to the second version of 
the Artwork Essay:  
 
Revolutions are innervations of the collective - or, more precisely, efforts at innervation on the 
part of the new, historically unique collective which has its organs in the new technology. This 
second technology is a system in which the mastering of elementary social forces is a 
precondition for playing [das Spiel] with natural forces.229 
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He continues by illustrating how this utopian interplay with nature should come about 
by using an example from developmental psychology. The child learns through 
reaching for the unreachable and "...stretches out its hand for the moon as it would for 
a ball"230. Humanity needs to uphold similar utopian aspirations. The second 
technology, originating in play, can through the proletarian revolution become a 
vehicle for increased freedom:  
 
Because this (second) technology aims at liberating human beings from drudgery, the 
individual suddenly sees his scope for play, his field of action [Spielraum] immeasurably 
expanded.231 
 
Inherent in this expanded field of action is also a crossing of political and natural 
history, which later would become a main concern in his anthropological materialist232 
politics. The utopian impulse in all revolutionary acts has a two-sided effect:  
 
No sooner has the second technology secured its initial revolutionary gains than vital 
questions affecting the individual - questions of love and death which had been buried by the 
first technology - once again press for solutions233 
 
To grasp what is meant by such questions, Benjamin emphasizes the way 
revolutionary movements induce a double "utopian will". After the initial upheaval of 
the second nature has made itself present, deeper and more subjective processes 
makes itself visible. Alongside the scientific and technological utopias of the second 
technology, a more subjective "utopia of the first" emerges. Bodily oriented, 
subjective dimensions of the human individual, previously neglected by the first 
technology, suddenly finds ways to express themselves."234 What are these 
dimensions? For Benjamin, this entails existential questions [Lebensfragen]: 
"questions of love and death". This unorthodox fusion of existential and political lines 
of reasoning may lose some of their obscure character if we recall the intrinsic 
connection between the suppressed urge for cosmic communion that re-emerged as 
the "slave revolt" of technology in To the Planetarium, and specifically at the very 
end of the text: "Living substance conquers the frenzy of destruction only in the 
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ecstasy of procreation."235 The connection between these final words of the text with 
the Artwork Essay above concerns the notion of "unresolved revolutionary demands 
of the first organic nature", and how these demands make themselves a vehicle for 
overcoming the destruction (death) through procreation [Liebe] (love, Eros, sex)236. If 
we follow Benjamin's reasoning, he diagnoses this rejected urge for collective 
communion as an intrinsic rejection of true existential needs, the needs that the 
proletariat cannot satiate within a bourgeois-capitalist paradigm. Through the 
revolution of the proletariat, a new “image-space” can be created out of the 
destruction of the bourgeois mode of perception, where such Lebensfragen can be 
posed and answered. This new image-space is set up by novel technological practices, 
and is constituted by the destruction of the old ways of perceiving reality.237 The 
“space for play” or “field of action” that is set up by technology expands, but mankind 
is still unable to familiarize itself with its potential. Instead of welcoming the new 
technological potential as a possibility of expanding this field of action, bourgeois-
capitalist interests, “and their lust for profit” took advantage of it, and turned the 
techno-wooing of the cosmos from a “bridal bed into a bloodbath”.238 In the modern 
capitalist paradigm, technology becomes a tool for domination over nature and the 
proletariat. Consequently, it is in their interest to close their eyes to the political 
implications of technology, as “second nature”.  
These dimensions of what potential "liberating" practices of the new 
technologies can elicit directs our attention to the interest Benjamin had in the early 
social utopian literature, and especially Charles Fourier239, whom Benjamin dedicated 
considerable attention to in his Passagen-werk. In short, the potential residing within 
his utopian science-fiction project is one that not only could transform, but also 
redress the discrepancies in human historical existence. Here his Messianistic vision 
of redeeming the past merges with his future-oriented Marxist agenda of the liberation 
of the proletariat. It is here that the concept of innervation must be seen in the light of 
his more basic speculations on history.  
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23. Film, innervation, catharsis 
We are by a detour back to the relation between film and innervation. As we have 
discussed some key aspects of the relation between the technologies of reproduction, 
innervation, mimetic play, and as the possibility of a new cosmic communion, the role 
of film in Benjamin’s thinking has become more evident. The situation in which the 
early industrialized modernity found itself was therefore one of apparent 
shortcomings within the human constitution and historic predicament. Man was not 
yet able to suspend the "natural limitations" of both his body and society. It is out of 
this thematic juncture, between the historical, aesthetical and political, that Benjamin 
sketches a theory of film that he envisaged as able to overcome the physiological, 
historical, and ideological limitations of the human body. What does this mean in 
relation to his theory of technology?  
Firstly, the medium of film was for him a tool able to extend the human 
perceptual capacity to an extent that the camera adopts "Messianic-prophetic 
power"240. It became a compensatory tool for the limitations of the human sensorium.  
Further it was seen as potentially capable of dismantling conventional modes of 
perceiving reality, and finally it made possible a realization of the Surrealist dream of 
a merger between image and body space into the sensorium of the collective, meaning 
into the collective mode of reception.241 As mentioned, in Surrealism from 1929, 
Benjamin develops the notion of a "collective innervation" of mankind's body through 
technology. Again we se his emphasis on a new Physis being technologically 
organized, emphasizing the sensuous nature of our collective contact with it. 
 
Only when in technology, body and image space [Bildraum] so interpenetrate that all 
revolutionary tension becomes bodily collective innervation, and all bodily innervations of the 
collective become revolutionary discharge, will reality have transcended itself to the extent 
demanded by the Communist Manifesto.242  
 
The operative agents of such collective innervations are those technologies of 
reproduction that Benjamin would come to focus on in the 1930s: photography, radio, 
gramophone and film in particular. The hope Benjamin saw for establishing a 
sensuous mimetic relationship with the cosmos as second nature, had to come from 
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the experiential potential that such reproductive technologies facilitated. But can this 
kind of relationship be realized in actuality? Is there an actual “interplay” between 
Man and machine? We can discern a slight rhetorical element in Benjamin's polemical 
use of sexual and archaic language, reminiscent to his borrowing of the language of 
Surrealism. 
It is important to see his emphasis on using Surrealist metaphors as just that; 
metaphors. These images do not hide the fact that there cannot be an actual interplay 
between the human Physis and technology. As such, he is in stark opposition to the 
Jüngerian ideal of dislocation of subjective experience in favor of an “objective” 
merger of man and machine. Benjamin knows only to well that this interaction is of a 
metaphoric, or rather “imaginary” character. That said, the true agenda for his 
emphasis on innervation lies in the creative and transformative energies being 
released, in the sphere of the political as well as art.243 This is the true intention 
Benjamin has towards mimetic innervation with the second technology. And also the 
best explanation we can get as to what innervation actually does. Through these 
liberated energies, the intention from To the Planetarium can be realized, and harness 
the power of these energies towards a liberation of the proletariat. But there is yet 
another dimension in To the Planetarium, which seeks a re-awakening of the mimetic 
faculty, within the technologically infused second nature. To this task I will spend the 
last part of this paper. 
 
24. A return to the mimetic; Innervation as Catharsis? 
The impulse to theorize technology is for Benjamin, a component of a greater 
conceptual mosaic created to re-imagine the aesthetical in a time where the conditions 
of experience, affectivity, memory and imagination needs to be salvaged from the 
ruins of history called modernity.244 It is within this project that theorizing over the 
technically changed human sensorium finds its place.  
Beauty is semblance. In Benjamin's texts on aesthetics this recognition appears 
as symptomatic of the age that is ending. With mechanical reproduction technologies, 
the beautiful as sensuous appearance of the true or sensuous appearance of an idea 
was no longer valid. The shattering of tradition and the destruction of traditional 
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experience detached the notion of beauty from its reference, creating a conceptual 
void needing to be filled. Technology, as either transformative and liberating, or 
destructive and oppressive, makes Benjamin look for the origin of the classical 
distinction between semblance and play. We here run into one of numerous problems 
of translation in Benjamin's texts, as the German nouns Shein and Spiel has different 
and more figurative connotations than it's equivalent in English. Shein and Spiel, is 
traced back to German Idealism and ultimately to the ancient practice of mimesis. As 
mentioned in the first section of this essay, Benjamin bids for a new understanding of 
the mimetic practice, and introduces a way of seeing the mimetic impulse as inherent 
both within the human sensorium and in things themselves.245 Benjamin's approach to 
mimesis has philosophical precursors.246  According to Benjamin, in this ancient 
original form, semblance and play were to sides of the same coin, as it originated in 
the same human body. Initially, language and dance, as bodily practices had as basic 
characteristics of making things "apparent". In short, they play, or perform the 
"thing". As such, this reveals the polar qualities originally residing in the mimetic: 
"Semblance and play form an aesthetic polarity"247. With the emergence of western 
art there emerged an emphasis on semblance, manifesting itself as "Beautiful 
Semblance" within the western tradition.248 Being based on repetitious, experimenting 
and imaginative modalities, play is potentially a mode of action better suited for 
envisaging alternatives to the barbarism, and catastrophe of history. Now we may be 
better able to grasp why Benjamin put such emphasis on the innervation of second 
technology, founded in play. Miriam Bratu Hansen reads the concept of play as 
"potentially sidetracking the catastrophic history." She places the role of the second 
technology not only "in terms of is destructive, anaesthetic trajectory" but at the same 
time based "in a ludic and performative impulse"249. There is for Benjamin a hidden, 
yet drastically promising dimension inherent in second technology's potential role as 
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counter-force to the re-mythologization of modernity: 
 
A mimetic innervation of technology would counter the perpetuation of illusion promoted by 
fascism with an aesthetics of play, an imagination that plays games - but also, (...) gambles - 
with technology's otherness.250 
 
Remembering what Benjamin defined as the essential characteristic of the 
photograph, it’s contingent, immediate and non-intentional character; the innervation 
is here with what is not-the-same. We have through a technological mimesis been 
introduced to a new nature, never seen before. As a technological paradigm shift, the 
shooting of a film was seen as a hitherto unimaginable spectacle and a second-degree 
realism that leads him to compare the filmmaker to a surgeon. Unlike the magician, 
who heals by a laying-on of hands, the surgeon heals by penetrating the body. 
Benjamin continues to explain that it is "another nature which speaks to the camera as 
compared to the eye.’Other' above all in the sense that a space informed by human 
consciousness gives way to a space informed by the unconscious."251 As these new 
dimensions of reality, hitherto unrecognizable by the naked eye, became accessible 
through the use of the film camera, new ways of relating to nature also becomes 
possible. Going beyond our preconditioned ways of seeing, the ‘optical unconscious’ 
presents the observer with a vast space, or field of action, where the unimaginable 
takes place. This is for Benjamin the encounter of which technology is the mediator: a 
new relationship between man and nature: “It is through the camera that we first 
discover the optical unconscious, just as we discover the instinctual unconscious 
through psychoanalysis.”252 
Benjamin sees these two types of unconscious as closely related, as the camera 
captures dimensions of reality outside normal sense impressions. Through film, the 
divide between the realm of dreams and waking life has been transgressed. Benjamin 
sees the camera as responsible for creating a link so that “the individual perceptions of 
the psychotic or the dreamer can be appropriated by collective perception.”253 Here, 
we see a perspective closely resembling that of To the Planetarium, where “The 
“Lunaparks” are reconfigurations of sanatoria”254. This implies that technological 
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‘entertainment’ can function as a balancing force for the masses, instead of pertaining 
to technological play as a phantasmagoric training ground for factory labor. This 
could be done not by “depicting the dream world itself than by creating figures of 
collective dream, such as the globe-encircling Mickey Mouse”.255 In the transference 
between the subject on screen and the audience, there exists an antidote to the violent 
return of suppressed pathologies. The yearning for renewed ecstatic communion 
hitherto denied them in modern life can find it’s outlet in a “therapeutic detonation of 
the unconscious: 
 
If one considers the dangerous tensions which technology and its consequences have 
engendered in the masses at large – tendencies which at critical stages take on a psychotic 
character – one also has to recognize that this same technologization [Technisierung] has 
created the possibility of psychic immunization against such mass psychoses. (…) Collective 
laughter is one such preemptive and therapeutic eruption of such mass psychoses.256 
 
The film provoke this laughter through playing with the animate and inanimate, 
human and mechanical traits, but also through staging shocks, or rather counter 
shocks that creates a conversion between audience and film. Potentially, this effect 
also “innervate” between the human sensorium and the apparatus in such a way to 
create a re-conversion of split-off neurotic energy into sensory affect.257 
The Artwork essay’s message in relation to the “social function” of film 
technology becomes dependent on its “destructive, cathartic side”: the liquidation of 
the value of tradition in the cultural heritage”258. Although this is the only context 
Benjamin explicitly uses the word “cathartic” in relating to the destruction of the 
auratic. But this “liquidation” of tradition is not the only way I read Benjamin’s view 
of film technology as cathartic. In relation to how film provokes “collective laughter”, 
there are striking similarities to a very classical notion of catharsis; found in the 
“Poetics” of Aristotle. Reading through one interpretation of catharsis we notice the 
following in relation to Aristotle’s definition of the term as “through pity and fear 
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effecting the proper purgation of these emotions”259. The traditional interpretation of 
this line goes as follows: “…that tragedy, by arousing these emotions, has some sort 
of therapeutic effect upon the audience’s mental health, giving a pleasurable sense of 
relief- “in calm of mind, all passion spent””260. It seems to me strikingly similar in 
structure to that of Benjamin’s view of the way technology both is the source and the 
cure for the malady of technological alienation and shock, considering the quote 
above. Functioning homeopathically, film technology innervate the collective 
sensorium in actuality to such a degree that the release of the psychic shield through, 
and by the sensory experience of film, expels pent up tensions of “psychotic 
character” in the ‘mass’ audience. Thus, Benjamin’s identified the way film 
technology could work on the collective psyche as a purgatory function, and create a 
“psychic immunization”. It is also interesting to note the clear analogy between 
Benjamin and Aristotle in their similar emphasis on the connection between catharsis 
and mimesis. In Aristotle, the two terms are not clearly separate, as mimesis invokes 
the form or structure of the play, and catharsis its function or purpose. 261 The same 
can be seen in how Benjamin sees the mimetic as the structural component of 
innervation and the healing “collective laughter” as the completeness of cathartic 
purpose. Yet another point where Benjamin entails clear Aristotelian similarities is in 
relation to the emphasis both put on the importance of realizing mimetic action as 
imitation. Aristotle sees that when imitation is seen as imitation, and reaches 
completion as imitation, that catharsis comes about. Thus catharsis is the natural 
culmination of mimesis, in this sense: The recognition that the play is just mere play, 
not real life. It is a sensuous experience, and a passing out of the body, instead of its 
assimilation into grounds for action.262  This corresponds in many ways to the 
understanding Benjamin portrays in seeing the mimetic innervation between “second” 
technology (film) and the collective consciousness. There is in reality no actual 
merger between human Physis and Techne. Only through realizing the imaginative or 
rhetorical character of this interaction can true redemption take place. “The social 
function of film” is destructive yet creative. In the Artwork essay, the key message is 
that only through redemption of the mimetic, as imitation, as play, can Benjamin see 
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reproductive technologies invoke catharsis. 
If we see this emphasis on innervation as a conceptual tool for the politization 
of art, in response to the aesthetization of politics, implemented by the rise of fascism, 
we are far off a restored sensorium to an instinctually intact state. Being bound up 
with the fate of the mimetic faculty, collective innervation rests on how Benjamin 
sees mimesis as referring to a practice that bridges the gap between subject and 
object. In short, he attempts to find a way out of the conditioned split, induced by 
modernity, between experience and agency.263 The mimetic is invoked as process, 
activity, as ritual or play. Thus, he sees the mimetic impulse as a mode of cognition. 
This includes bodily, sensuous or tactile forms of perception.  
Having the same fate as the auratic character, the mimetic faculty is only seen 
vividly in its decline and decay. It's emergence as a concept stands in relation to the 
dissolution of what it claims to signify. The emphasis on mimesis for Benjamin is not 
motivated by a desire for a return to a primal, more “spiritual” time in history. Instead, 
in the Artwork essay, he wants to attempt at "re-enchanting" the modern world, 
through a resurgence of mimetic powers within it. Benjamin complicates the mimetic, 
fictional dimension of play with the "dark compulsion to repeat", the urge to do "the 
same thing over and over again".264 Inspired by Freud, he finds a way to reconfigure 
Erlebnis, and create a "the transformation of a shattering experience into habit".265 
Repetition in play, as the child does, is for Benjamin connected to the existential quest 
for happiness, and through technological utilization, mimetic, playful repetition fins a 
liberating, apotropatic function266. Labor can potentially be an activity of self-
realization. 
Taken the above account of the relation between technology and mimetic 
repetition into account, a few questions come to mind in reading To the Planetarium. 
We recall how the mimetic interplay between the cosmos and man originally played 
itself out communally, and as a force that cannot be rejected. The emphasis is clearly 
on the mimetic repetition inherent in technology as “second nature”, not only in 
mankind: The objective is to "transform" rather than witness the decay of the mimetic 
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faculty.267 As we have seen, reasons why he maintains such faith in a reconfigured 
and transformed mimetic practice are found in discarded or unconventional modes 
(e.g., the child, surrealism, experiments with hashish) of human perception, and 
within a technologically altered perceptive field; they all pertain to what Benjamin 
described as "Profane Illumination":  
 
"The collective is a body too. And the Physis that is being organized for it in technology can, 
through all its political and factual reality, be produced only in that image space to which 
profane illumination initiates us."268 
 
In this passage from his essay on Surrealism (1929), he envisaged the realization of 
the revolutionary project in terms of a transformed consciousness of a future 
collectivity. It resembles strikingly his vision of redeemed second nature in To the 
Planetarium: “In technology, a physis is being organized through which mankind’s 
contact with the cosmos takes a new and different form from that which it had in 
nations and families.”269 Within the image space “initiated” by Profane Illumination, 
mankind’s suppressed existential questions, or Lebensfragen can find room to be 
explored and answered. More importantly, through this image space, the genuine 
auratic trace is to be found. 
 
25. Conclusion 
What is the bottom line that Benjamin is getting at through his thoughts on 
technology, play, shattering and mimesis? Is there a real trace of the aura to be found? 
In following Benjamin’s path from a diagnosis of the “hellish” state of modernity in 
which he lived, through the destruction of traditional modes of experience and the 
decay of the aura, he launched an alternative to the dire situation he saw modern man 
found himself. Only through wresting the revolutionary power from the destructive 
forces of technology could a new, redeemed proletariat emerge from the ruins of the 
world wars. In defining how technological shocks could be used in a constructive 
way, he envisaged a reawakening of the mimetic powers in man, and through this 
reawakening undoing the traumatized collective. Only through this awakening could a 
new interplay with technology take place, and through this interplay could the basic 
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needs of mankind be answered. 
This essay has attempted to show how there is a clear and consistent thread 
running through Benjamin’s writings, starting with One Way Street: Mimetic 
innervation fulfills the task of his theory of technology. It enacts a sensuous contact 
and communion with the cosmos through working “homeopathically”, as a form of 
catharsis. Innervation, in conjunction with mimetic play is the pair of concepts that 
stands out in Benjamin’s theoretical toolkit in the attempt at wrestling back the power 
from capitalist agendas, and empowering the proletariat. And this is done through the 
very technology that accelerated the process of the “decay of aura”. 
We have seen how Benjamin diagnosed the underlying reasons for the trauma 
of the First World War and the alienation and suppression of the masses in the 
decades that followed as being closely related to the misuse of technological potential, 
channeled solely into a capitalist industrial framework. I have shown how Benjamin 
both embraced the technological destruction of aura and revealed the inherent 
problems associated with the loss of traditional modes of existence, and the way this 
destruction induced a reconstitution of human experience.  As a response to the 
ambiguous nature and role of modern technological progress, Benjamin developed a 
critical theory of technology, and through it aimed at evolving beyond a technological 
determinism. This was mainly done by developing a theory of technology where the 
concepts of mimetic play and innervation play a decisive role. I have argued that what 
Benjamin is aiming at in this utopian understanding of technology in One Way Street, 
and the Artwork essay is a re-enchantment of the mundane, everyday world of 
modernity, or a restauration of the classical aesthetic dimensions of experience. 
Further, I have shown how the Artwork essay is a continuation of the main theses in 
To the Planetarium. Through film and photographic technology, the very technology 
that created the old world of “incarceration” will be exploded, leading to an 
“adventurous journey among the scattered ruins”.  
More than any other 20th century critic, Benjamin theorized the tyranny of 
discursive reason and insisting on the irreducibility of an embodied experiential 
domain, bound up with the body. Through my reading his theory of technology, I 
have argued that his concept of the decay of aura entails the existence of both genuine 
and non-genuine traces. I have also shown how Benjamin saw the way the perception 
of children could be seen as examples of original mimetic play, and evidence of the 
existence of the “mimetic faculty” in modern humans. Further, in unraveling the 
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concept of mimetic innervation I have emphasized its role in One Way Street and the 
Artwork essay as inherently linked to our understanding of technology as “second 
technology and nature as  “second” nature. Being bound up with the ancient 
understanding of mimetic practice as embodied innervation, the cathartic effect that 
technological innervation is seen by Benjamin as uncovering this mimetic faculty. 
Within a collective mode of reception in contact with a technologically imbued 
second nature, this clears the way for a possible redemption of repressed existential 
needs, denied by the conditions of society.  
In "Some Motifs on Baudelaire" Benjamin develops a model of technology 
that mirrors his cosmological conception of technology sketched in "To the 
Planetarium". World War I was a harbinger of a "new barbarism", and through its 
sheer horror of unprecedented destruction, it forces mankind to recognize its error: the 
error of dismissing the collective experience of the cosmos as unimportant, avoidable 
and of private concern. The War is construed by Benjamin as a deed of Nature itself, 
as an agent of a technologically infused cosmos. As we have seen above, the central 
issue in his theory of technology is related to mankind's need to establish a felicitous 
and non-destructive form of collective cosmic communion. That being said, what 
relevance can we recover of Benjamin's thought without relapsing into an emphasis 
on their out-datedness? Whatever hopes we may indeed have of establishing and 
maintaining mimetic contact with an ever increasingly technological second nature 
may require that we follow Benjamin's somewhat obscure and intricate trajectory 
from a theory of profane illumination to one of physiological mimesis. A path I have 
attempted to give a modest description of in this paper. If we aspire to implement the 
liberating project Benjamin constructs to our own reality, we must refuse to 
compromise the basic heterogeneity he maintains between the root physiological 
reality of innervation encompassed in To the Planetarium and the cognitive grounding 
he gives it in the Artwork Essay and Surrealism text. In this way, can the more 
fundamental philosophical project Benjamin was unable to complete, find new and 
fruitful pathways.  
Being a border, surface and interface, mimetic innervation functions as 
mankind’s alternative against a repetition of world war. Facing yet another “slave-
revolt” of technology, in the political situation of our own time, these thoughts may 
show renewed relevance, as the War against Terror still leaves the “tiny, fragile, 
human body” vulnerable and exposed to technologically rendered destruction taking 
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place in Iraq and other places on the planet.  
Technology elicits a destructive clearing away of suppressive modes of 
perception through the innervation with the collective consciousness. I have 
attempted to show how Benjamin’s dialectical conception of destructive/shattering vs. 
creative/healing relationship related to technology. This destructive/creative 
conjunction is seen clearest in the Optical unconscious. This is one example of a 
technical medium, or space into which a restored mimetic capacity plays itself out. To 
become effectual mimetic innervation, the optical unconscious, as psychoanalytically 
inflected temporality, needs to engage with the collective subjectivity of mimetic 
innervation. Only if the extension of the human sensorium converts into an active, 
empowering incorporation of the apparatus on the part of the Cinema audience, or 
collective, can this transformation occur. Benjamin’s aspirations on behalf of 
technologies of reproduction can in retrospect seem unrealistic, and flawed. His hopes 
for the mass-reception of films of montage-like character was short lived, and today, 
film is just as much a realm of myth and phantasmagoric character as urban society 
was in Benjamin’s own time. In addition, the real revolutionary force of what would 
invoke the collective innervation on a grand scale has never emerged, even in 
countries where Communism is predominant. Yet, the collective mimetic innervation 
envisaged within the cinema combines both abstract and concrete connotations: It 
exemplifies an alternative mode of interaction and utilization of technology per se, 
creating novel ways to harness its previously misused potential. Only the proletariat, 
in its necessary collectivity can utilize this potential. For Benjamin, the private, 
bourgeois-capitalist paradigm necessarily culminates in war. Secondly, it refers to the 
actual cinematic experience, where the audience itself becomes the collective, and an 
actual alternative interaction with technology and modernity.  
Benjamin attempts to recover a corporeal mimeticism that promotes a form of 
embodiment anchored in the “tiny, fragile human body”. This is not a return to a 
primordial, pristine interaction with nature as was the case with the “first” technology. 
Instead, bodily mimeticism entails an embrace and not rejection of the shattering 
nature of technology, and its “otherness”. Through the encounter with this otherness 
Benjamin sees potential communion with a new cosmos, and through this encounter 
humanity may find answers to their long-repressed Lebensfragen. Mimetic 
innervation may function as an allegorical steppingstone for surpassing the dualistic 
and unwholesome splitting of experience as Erfahrung into agency, object and 
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observer.270 It can redeem the splitting of Erfahrung and through it the original auratic 
trace, by way of adjusting our experiential capacity to address the concrete, material 
realities of a technologically infused second nature. For Benjamin, this transformation 
of experience is not a relapse to an instrumental approach to the present”.271 Instead, it 
calls for recognition of our outmoded perception of reality. To wrest a truly redeemed 
yet liberated proletariat from the “Ur-history” of modernity, mankind must perform a 
revaluation of our priorities as practical embodied agents. If mankind is to grasp the 
technological becoming that continually evolves before its eyes, an innervation of the 
collective body needs to address the desire for embodied contact with the cosmos, to 
complete mankind as a species‘development. As stated in To the Planetarium:  
 
Men as a species completed their development thousands of years ago; but mankind as a 
species is just beginning his.272  
 
Benjamin sees this development as dependent on our capacity to radically expand 
human consciousness toward a grander perception of nature and cosmos: 
 
The paroxysm of genuine cosmic experience is not tied to that tiny fragment of nature that we 
are accustomed to call “Nature.273  
 
Exactly such contact with a grander cosmos forms the object of the mimetic 
sensuousity, imparted by our now miniaturized and commodified technologies. It is 
what gives capitalist utilization of technology power. Whatever hopes for redeeming 
modernity of its cultural commitments can only come through a deepening of our 
mimetic command over this properly un-representable, immediate and non-cognitive 
experiential dimension. Benjamin insisted that only a collective awakening from the 
phantasmagorical dreams of mass culture can mankind truly face this existential 
“otherness”.  
Technology's "otherness" needs to be recognized, but to what extent could we 
see our interaction with it as based on play, or interplay? This point can bring our 
attention yet again to One Way Street, where reflections on the technological and the 
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techniques of the individual body emerge with emphasis on what Wohlfarth deemed 
the mythic/historical triads. Does Benjamin aim for a secular, worldly redemption, or 
just the liberation of the proletariat? This loosely relates to the mending or return to an 
edenic harmony analogous to his reading of the Kabbalistic Tikkun Olam (mending 
the world). Tikkun is oriented towards the future, and the revolution of the proletariat 
is its secular manifestation. The mythic circle comes to completion, but only if 
instigated through the action of mankind itself. After the shattering, there is 
redemption, or repair of the “broken vessel”, connected to the work of humanity, and 
accordingly brings the possibility of the messianic age. The Messiah is not coming 
into this world but is a product of man’s work of creation. It becomes a symbol of the 
completion of Tikkun. Benjamin’s interpretation of this principle is translated into 
artistic practice, and political action. Not being a practitioner of Judaism, nor a theistic 
believer of the Messiah, he is instead an interpreter and critical observer of culture.274 
His project is one of theorizing the ruinous and inherently barbaric material conditions 
of modernity. Through his utilization of various creative theories, like Surrealism, 
Freudianism, Marxism, Dadaism and Kabbalism among others, he aspires to find 
grounds for a mending, or redemption of the conditions of the world within mundane 
existence. The messianic is thus a symbolic figure of the completed re-construction of 
wholeness in the world.275 If we look back at Benjamin’s theory of technology, it 
reveals the dialectic between the two terms intimately related concepts of 
dissemination, fragmentation of dispersal (die Zerstreung) and collection, assemblage, 
gathering together (die Sammlung). This dialectical constellation reveals itself, and 
their Kabbalistic notions of shevira and tikkun. 
How is Benjamin going answer his fundamental question concerning 
mankind's relation to technology? A more precise question would rather be in what 
way can mankind establish and maintain a sound and balanced contact with the ever 
complexifying, technologically driven cosmos in our contemporary age? There may 
not be any answer to this question, and a reading of Benjamin’s theory of technology 
may evoke more questions than it can answer. But the core of his theory of 
technology was an attempt at creating new ways of interaction with a larger field of 
experience. His example can help us construct the analytical tools needed to resist 
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seductions of disembodiment projected by contemporary reproductive and virtual 
technologies.  
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